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Preface 
The Maastricht Treaty provided for a consultative "Committee of the Regions" 
which was to bring the European Union's "third level" into the deliberation of 
legislation. It began to operate in early 1994. The contributions to this working 
paper are updated· and revised versions of a conference held at the European 
University Institute in January 1995 to review the experiences and to discuss the 
prospects relating to this new body. 
The question governing this discussion - "what model for the Committee of 
the Regions?" - indicates the presumption that the role of the Committee within 
the Union's institutional structure has not been fully defined. It is a novel 
institution which has, per se, no counterpart in other politicat systems. It has 
come into being only after prolonged debate and arguments inside the 
InterGovernmental Conference and within the Member States. Then came the 
delay due to the late ratification of the Maastricht Treaty itself. And almost as 
soon as work started for the Committee, the long shadows of the next IGC in 
1996 began to fall ahead. Thus a reorganisation of tasks and competences- and 
with them a redefined role for the Committee - is already on the agenda. 
What we are confronted with is, first of all, an apparent paradox: an 
advisory body composed elected politicians. There are no ready models for the 
analysis of a such a novel institution in period of flux. Yet one may hypothesize 
about the emergence of one or the other institutional form. The structure of the 
conference and of this working paper have followed this conception. The 
Committee's official function- consultation- is a broad category, which leaves 
open whether in the future its representative or the advisory aspects will be more 
significant. The contributions here take this openness as a point of departure. 
These diverse experiences with different types of consultative politics, allows us 
to gain new insights into the operation of the Committee. 
The opening chapter by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks on the channels of 
sub-national representation demonstrates the range of inter-mediative tools 
regional actors have in the recent past developed to influence Community 
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decision-making. His discussion of the various, complementary routes of access 
of regional and local government to the Community centre demonstrates the 
dynamics underlying these cross-level relationships in recent years. Ifts chapter 
also helps to put into perspective the role of the Committee. In many ways its 
'consultative' functions were already preempted by a the emergence of intensive 
lobbying by regions- individually and collectively. Thomas Christiansen in his 
contribution charts the difficult first year of the Committee, illustrating that 
much of the credit and high expectations were not borne out by recent practice 
in the chamber. A number of divisions cutting through the Committee 
membership, above all along national lines, sheds a questionable light on the 
idea of a 'common interest' among regional governmets - an idea, after all, 
which was a major driving force in the creation of the Committee. 
Against this context of developments, different experiences of consultative 
politics are then discussed. Andrew Barker begins this exercise with a paper on 
policy-advice, pointing to the power, but also the perils, of what he calls 
'knowledge authority'. Comparing the results of his research on the practice of 
policy-advice in the UK, he points to the Committee's political ambiguity: its 
quality is its 'representational value', i.e. the fact that locally elected politicians 
bring in their expertise might provide additional legitimacy. At the same time 
the nature of party politics might damage the notion of neutral and objective 
advice, and consequently the standing of the Committee might suffer. 
This is echoed in the conclusion of John Kincaid's chapter on the US 
experience. Here the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs has 
become the victim of partisan party politics after a proven track record of 
influential policy-advice. Roger Morgan presents the experience of the Economic 
and Social Committee of the European Community. This, too, has in past years 
seen a decline of its significance. The reasons for this lie not simply in the 
unbinding nature of its opinions, nor only in the fact that it brings together three 
antagonistic forces, but is also due to direct lobbying which social and economic 
interests increasingly undertake, thereby eclipsing the institutionalized tripartite 
model. 
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These attempts at consultation are compared, in the final contribution, by 
Roland Sturm's paper on the experience of second chambers. Yet also they have 
benefitted more from the avoidance of conflict with frrst chambers and from the 
accomplishment of in-depth and sober problem analysis rather than from rising 
political tension. 
The respective usefulness of these different approaches demonstrates that 
each goes some way to explain the dynamics of the Committee of the Regions. 
Some paradox outcomes have thus been brought to the fore. What was to be 
"Committee of the Regions" had turned out to be divided along national lines; 
the 'strong regions' from Germany, Belgium and Spain that had pressed most 
for its establishment were now that the Committee had begun to work in earnest 
a disenchanted minority; and what was meant as a body for deliberation and 
consultation had become an organ for political representation and was seen by 
some as the future second or third chamber of the Union. 
Consequently, the discussion also points to some of the risks involved in the 
decisions which have yet to be taken. The problematic relationship between 
policy-advice and representational politics is one such instance which will 
require further attention in future research. We hope that this working paper 
succeeds in not just indicating the major strands of institutional development, 
but also in pointing towards the consequences of the difficult choices ahead. 
Florence, April 1995 
Renaud Dehousse Thomas Christiansen 
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Channels of Subnational Representation in the European Union 
Liesbet Hoogh/ 
Gary Marks .. 
One of the most important consequences of European integration is the 
multiplication of channels for subnational political activity. Subriational 
governments are no longer constrained to diadic political relations with central 
state actors, but interact with a variety of actors in diverse arenas. In recent 
years there have been many signs of this. Local and regional governments from 
several member states have set up autonomous offices directly in Brussels; 
subnational governments, across the EU and beyond, have created a complex 
and still largely uncharted maze of formal and informal networks; in regions 
~~~g:n(lted for EU cohesion funding, subnational officials help desi;-~d 
implement economic development . plans alongside national and Commission 
officials; in)3~lgium and Germany, regional. actors participate directly in their 
country's representation on the Council of Ministers; and, finally, subnational 
governments are represented in highly visible, though primarily symbolic, 
assemblies -- most notably the new Committee of the Regions established in the 
Maastricht Treaty. But, and this is a distinctive feature of multi-level governance 
in the European Union, regions do not engage in these activities equally. There 
is no congruence, nor even convergence, in the political role of regions in the 
European Union. Instead, there are enormous disparities in the level of 
organization, financial resources, political autonomy, and political influence of 
subnational governments across Europe 1• 
Before we outline the activities of regional governments in more detail, it 
is worth considering the implications of such territorial diversity. Political 
channels, both formal and informal, for regional actors have multiplied beyond 
recognition, and now they stretch far beyond the boundaries of their respective 
' Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. 
•• Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
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states, but there are wide differences in the capacity of regional actors to exploit 
these channels. A multi-level polity has developed, but there is no territorial 
uniformity in its operation. In fact, the creation of new avenues for regional 
mobilization brings into focus persistent differences in the organizational and 
political capacities of regional actors. At one extreme, German Lander, Belgian 
regions, and Spanish cornmunidades aut6nomas are well funded, strongly 
institutionalized, entrenched within their respective states, and active in the 
European arena. At the other extreme, regional governments hardly exist in 
Greece, Ireland, or Portugal and are virtually silent at the European level? If 
one wishes to find subnational political actors in the latter countries, one has to 
look to town and city mayors who, even if there are aware of opportunities in 
the European political arena, lack the resources to mobilize there. 
There is, therefore, little sign of the kind of territorial convergence implied 
in the notion of a ''Europe of the Regions." In perhaps no other area of political 
institutionalization in the European polity is there greater diversity than in the 
territorial politics of the member states. Multi-level governance seems to be 
leading not to uniformity but to continued diversity as contrasting regional actors 
are brought together within an overarching polity. 
In this paper we survey the five principal channels of subnational 
representation in the European Union: the Committee of the Regions, the 
Council of Ministers, the Commission, Regional Offices, and transnational 
associations. To what extent do these channels empower subnational 
governments within the European Union? 
The Committee of the Regions 
At Maastricht, the member states agreed in a Protocol attached to the Treaty 
to expand the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities, set up by 
the Commission in 1988 with consultative rights over the formulation and 
implementation of regional policies, into a Committee of the Regions on lines 
parallel to the existing Economic and Social Committee. The Committee of the 
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Regions has a larger membership than the previous Consultative Council (189 
against 42) and although the new body remains largely symbolic, it is given a 
wider consultative role3• The Protocol directs the Council of Ministers and 
Commission to consult with the Committee of the Regions on regional issues. 
In addition the Committee can forward its opinion to the Council and 
Commission "in cases in which it considers such action appropriate." 
The Committee has advisory, not co-decision, powers. It must be consulted 
by the Council or the Commission (not the Parliament) on five matters: 
education and vocational training. health, culture, trans-European networks, and 
economic and social cohesion. It may also provide opinions on any other matter. 
Ultimately, the Committee has to rely on persuasion or on those members who 
could pressure their national governments (Belgian, German and Spanish regions 
in particular)4• 
Several features weaken the Committee's capacity to act cohesively for 
subnational interests. In certain countries it is the national government that 
selects its subnational representatives on the Committee. The 24 representatives 
of the UK are picked by the central government to represent a patchwork of 
local and 'regional' authorities. In France, central government's role in selecting 
representatives is enhanced because not all regions and only a handful of 
localities are able to be represented. In contrast, Belgian, Spanish, German, and 
Austrian regions each have their own seat in the Committee, and national 
constraints are virtually absent. 
In the second place, the Committee is severely divided internally. The major 
conflict is between local and regional interests. The representatives are mostly 
regional in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Spain and Italy, while in 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden and the UK they are mostly local. The local-regional divide comes 
down largely to the difference between federal or regionalised countries, on the 
one hand, and unitary member states on the other. This cleavage is crosscut by 
a rift between the North and the South of Europe, pitting contributors to the EU 
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budget against beneficiaries. The North-South rift is reinforced by a contrast in 
political styles6• 
The Council of Ministers 
Although subnational governments now have a European insitution of their 
own through which they can channel their concerns, this is not necessarily the 
most effective strategy. Their influence on European decision making may be 
greater if they are able to work through other European institutions such as the 
Council of Ministers or the European Commission, but this depends on certain 
conditions. To the extent that subnational governments are entrenched in their 
respective states, they have been able to exert pressure on their respective state 
executives to gain voice on particular policies and institutionalized influence on 
the most powerful EU institution, the Council of Ministers. 
Under the new Article 146 of the Treaty a member state can send regional 
ministers to the Council of Ministers, who are allowed to negotiate and bind the 
member state7• So regional authorities can be at the centre of decision making. 
However, this channel is highly selective. Only Belgian regions (and 
communities) and German Lander currently have access to it. Spanish regions 
are demanding a similar arrangement, and Austrian Lander will probably be able 
to take advantage of the new procedure. It is unlikely to be available to 
subnational authorities in other member states. 
The development and character of regional input in Germany and Belgium 
are sharply contrasting. Germany has taken a gradual and moderate path, while 
Belgium has changed radically over a short period of time. German regions have 
also generally worked collectively, while Belgian regions usually link up 
separately with the European arena. The latter distinction runs through nearly all 
arrangements. German Lander share a regional observer (Landerbeobachter) in 
the German Permanent Representation. For Belgium, the Walloon Region and 
the French Community each have one regional observer, while Flanders has not 
yet appointed a representative. 
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In Spain, Convergencia i Unio (CiU), the ruling party in Catalonia, exploited 
its coalition potential after the 1993 election to gain a larger role in EU decision 
making. In return for CiU's agreement to support the Socialist government, the 
Socialist party (PSOE) agreed to revaluate regional representation in all EU 
organs and incorporate regional representatives in decision making on regional 
competencies. PSOE also agreed to set up a bilateral commission to inform state 
institutions of regional government positions on EU issues8 • . 
Formal channels are by no means the only ways to involve subnational 
authorities in European decision making. Most member states have developed 
practices to take territorially diverse interests into account. In the UK delegation 
in Brussels, Welsh and Scottish administrations are represented indirectly 
through appointments in functional areas of special concern to them. For 
example, European fisheries policy and regional policy tend to be monitored by 
civil servants from the Scottish Office. However, civil servants in Wales and 
Scotland work ultimately within a unitary framework9 • Similarly, the French 
system of cumul de mandats, in combination with party allegiance, can give 
regional politicians--not necessarily regional administrations--considerable room 
to influence the French position. 
Links with the Commission 
A third institutional channel consists of the participation of subnational 
actors in the EU's structural or cohesion policy, which aims at reducing 
disparities among the regions in the european union10• The 1988 reform of the 
structural funds stipulates that the Commission, national authorities, regional or 
local authorities and social actors should work in close, equal and ongoing 
"partnership"11• The chief bureaucratic expression of partnership has been the 
establishment of monitoring committees, which include subnational 
representatives alongside representatives of the Commission and central 
government, to formulate, manage and assess regional programs within broadly 
defined guidelines. 
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Cohesion policy has produced a highly uneven pattern of subnational 
mobilisation across the EU. This is partly by design, because structural policy, 
which forms the core of EU cohesion policy, is by definition discriminatory. 
About 40% of the population is covered by structural policy, including the 
whole of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, Southern Italy, eastern Germany, 
alongside parts of the UK, Belgium, France (and its overseas territories), and 
western Germany. 
Within those selected areas, partnership has operated differently from one 
member state to another12• The bulk of the redistribution is organized in 
Community Support Frameworks, economic development plans for each of the 
participating member states and constituent regions. More than any other EU 
policy, cohesion policy reaches directly into the member states, directl 
. b . y 
engagmg su natiOnal governments and private actors with the Commission and 
member state governments. Unlike the budget for cohesion policy, which is 
determined largely by intergovernmental bargaining, there is a diverse array of 
networks across individual member states concerned with decision making in 
structural programming. Actors vary enormously from one network to another 
1ut there is one actor common to all: the European Commission. ' 
~o what extent have subnational governments been empowered by the 
practice of cohesion policy? It would be premature to jump to hard conclusions 
on this question, for structural programming is a recent innovation. The first 
round of structural programming began in 1989 and was completed only last 
year, while the second round is, at this time of writing, only just underway. In 
sue~ a _brief time span one is unlikely to find dramatic institutional recasting of 
temtonal relations. The causal path from structural programming to institutional 
relations among levels of government is complex and convoluted: first, one 
might look for rising expectations on the part of key subnational actors as a 
result of their integration (or lack of integration!) in cohesion policy formulation 
and implementation; further along the causal path, one might examine the extent 
11 
to which this has led to mobilization of demands on the part of subnational 
actors for political influence and perhaps even demands for some constitutional 
revision of territorial relations; at the same time, one would expect to find some 
response on the part of central government actors, perhaps a concerted attempt 
to use cohesion policy to buttress central coordination; finally, one would have 
to analyze the dynamics of the resulting contention. 0ne of the basic _elements 
of this story -- and arguably of any sensible modelling of causality here -- is that 
it involves a sequence of lags. The time scale for major institutional change as 
a consequence of these processes may be one of decades rather than months or 
years 13• 
But it is not, perhaps, too early to take stock of initial, more subtle, signs of 
change that appear to have taken place between the first round of structural 
programming in 1989 and the beginning of the second round in 1994. 
Summarizing the impact of the first round of structural programming in 
Ireland, Brigid Laffan writes that "the 1988 reform of the Funds undermined the 
gatekeeper role of central government"14. While the overall ~tructure of power 
has not shifted decisively, cohesion policy has "disturbed" relations between 
central and local actors: local community groups have been mobilized, local 
input into central government policy has been enhanced, local actors have 
sought greater control over local economic development, and new impetus has 
been generated for a major overhaul of Irish local governmene5• 
In Greece, as in Ireland, the first round of structural programming from 1989 
to 1993 did not result in a decisive institutional shift in territorial relations. 
However, at an informal level, Ioakirnidis diagnoses that structural programming 
has energized subnational government, raising expectations and demands, 
modernizing bureaucracies, and creating new communication channels for local 
and regional authorities, linking them with central government, with subnational 
governments in the rest of Europe, and with the Commission, bypassing central 
governmene6• Ioakimidis writes that the "rudimentary bases of multilevel 
governance can be discerned in these developments," a strong claim given that 
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Greece remains one of the most centralized states, if not the most centralized 
U . 17 ' in the European ruon . 
In Belgium and Spain cohesion policy feeds into pressures for 
regionalization and the ongoing conflict concerning the allocation of 
competencies across levels of government. In both countries territorial relations 
have been in flux, but in each case the effects of cohesion policy interact with 
deep-seated and more powerful forces rooted in ethno-cultural conflicts. 
In Belgium, according to De Rynck, the introduction of structural 
progranuning has coincided with, and reinforced, the territorial restructuring of 
the Belgian state. There has been a simultaneous centralization and 
decentralization of competencies from the first round of structural programming 
(1989-1993 to the second (1994-1999) as decision making has shifted to the 
regional level at the expense of both the central state and localities. Structural 
progranuning has taken place in a contentious situation in which political actors 
at each level of government were already mobilized, and as a result it has been 
the object of strategic interaction rather than a source of new expectations or 
demands as in Ireland or Greece. The chief independent effect of structural 
programming has been to stir up the already complex institutional pie of Belgian 
administration by facilitating the creation of new agencies which are controlled 
by the regional government rather than by local or national authorities. 18 As 
Liesbet Hooghe has observed, although the European Union has offered 
opportunities to local actors, "the EC clearly constitutes a window of opportunity 
for regions to strengthen their position vis a vis a weak nation-state 
govemment' 119• 
The effects of structural programming in Spain have interacted with the 
ongoing process of regionalization and the ongoing conflict between the central 
state and regions, particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country, about regional 
competencies. The Communidades Autonomas, particularly those empowered 
under the special statutes, were too strongly entrenched too be excluded from 
structural programming, but neither have they been integrated into it. Successive 
Spanish governments have tried to bypass the regions, or where this was not 
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feasible, have tried to contain regional influence by splitting funding across 
national and regional budgets. 
In Italy, coordination problems have impeded structural programming and 
a significant proportion of allocated EU funds were never spent. Jiirgen Grote 
observes that "relations between the European Union and the regions, for 
example during the implementation of the Integrated Mediterranean Pro~ammes 
and under the reformed structural funds, take place in an extra-legal space 
without any basis in constitutional or other legal provisions' 120• Within this 
disarticulated context, structural programming appears to have been a pressure 
for the reform and rationalization of regional-national relations in the direction 
of informal partnership. 
In France, Germany, and the UK, territorial relations are highly 
institutionalized and the funds provided by the EU for regional development are 
either about the same (in the case of France) or less (in the cases of Germany 
and the UK) than the funds provided by the central state. The Commission has 
had little influence over policy making or the allocation of competencies across 
policy participants. Richard Balme and Bernard Jouve find that, in the case of 
the Rh6nes-Alpes, "there is no evidence of [new] networks substituting or 
replacing previous ones"21 • The central government planning agency, DATAR, 
along with Regional Prefects, were successful in coordinating subnational 
governments and, thereby, constraining regional autonomy. Structural 
programming in Germany has been integrated into the existing, and very highly 
institutionalized, Gemeinschaftsaufgabe network linking regional governments 
to the Federal state and to each other. Moreover, German territorial relations 
already embody aspects of the partnership principle promulgated by the 
Commission, and so EU structural programming advances norms that are already 
established in Germany. In the UK, as well, structural programming has left 
formal institutions intact. Local authorities remain constitutionally impotent and 
dependent on central government, which dominates not only resources but the 
allocation of competencies across levels of government. 
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However, in France and the UK, there are signs that the experience of 
strUctural programming has buttressed demands on the part of subnational actors 
for participation in regional planning and has, at the very least, intensified 
contention between subnational and central government. 
Regional Councils in France have begun to play a more influential role in 
negotiating the Contrats de Plan that form the basis for the French CSF. No 
longer does DATAR dominate the process of formulating the plans; under the 
most recent round of structural programming they are determined by negotiation 
between Regional Councils and Prefectures22• The result of this is not that 
central government has lost its predominance. Rather, the outcome seems to be 
increased conflict and mistrust across levels of government focussed on issues 
such as the umesolved composition of the Monitoring Committee and the role 
of Regional Councils in cross-border arrangements. 
In the UK, structural programming has enhanced expectations among 
subnational actors concerning their role in regional development and has 
precipitated a variety of new subnational partnerships including, most notably, 
the North-West Regional Association, a broad based association of regional-level 
actors. Exposure of local government officials to structural programming has 
opened new perspectives for them and made them impatient with London's 
resistance to the implementation of partnership23 • In short, according to Bache, 
George, and Rhodes, "cohesion policy triggered institutional changes supporting 
the role of local and regional authorities in EC policy making at both the 
national and supranational levels"24• 
Regional Offices 
In recent years subnational governments have established independent offices 
in Brussels which lobby, gather information, and network with other regional 
actors and with EU political actors. The first regional offices were set up in 
1985 by Hamburg and Saarland. Three years later there were 18 such offices. 
At this time of writing there are 70 if one includes offices representing 
individual cities and national associations of local governments alongside those 
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representing regions and localities. They range from poorly funded bureaus, 
staffed by one or two part-time officers, to large quasi-embassies employing (in 
the case of the Catalan office and several Lander offices) as many as 20 
representatives in addition to secretarial staff. 
The existence and type of regional office in Brussels varies decisively across 
countries. All sixteen German Lander plus Berlin are represented, bofl1 Belgium 
regions are represented as are half of the Spanish communidades autonomas. 
These are countries with a strong tier of regional representation, and in each 
case that tier dominates representation in Brussels. In France the regional tier of 
subnational government is weaker and although most offices were established 
by regions, two departements also have offices. In the United Kingdom, where 
subnational government is relatively weak, local authorities, regional quangos, 
regional enterprise organizations, national local authority organizations, and even 
universities, fund 17 offices representing an individual city (Birmingham), 
individual local authorities, regional groupings of local authorities, a national 
local authority organization, alongside offices representing the North of England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. 
Independent representation of subnational governments in the remaining 
countries is very weak or non-existent. Italy provides just two offices, neither 
of which represent regional governments. An office from Lazio is funded by 
private business, while the Italian government funds an office representing the 
Mezzoriorno. Regional governments in Italy are impeded from setting up offices 
by the 1970 constitution which gives the state executive exclusive competence 
in international affairs. Denmark, which has a weak tier of regional 
administration, is represented by three towns. Ireland has just one regional 
office, while no subnational governments in Portugal or Greece have offices in 
Brussels (see annex 1). 
Quantitative analysis of this phenomenon reveals that the regions having 
representation are not those that receive the most funding from the EU, or the 
poorest, most needy, regions. Rather, the most politically entrenched, most 
ethnically distinct, and richest regions are present. Hence, the contrast between 
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Spain on the one hand and Portugal and Greece on the other. The influence of 
resources on representation can also be se-e~ within Spain. Among the 
communidades aut6nomas there is a strong positive association between having 
an office in Brussels and size of budget25• 
The regions that are represented directly in Brussels engage both in 
competition and cooperation depending on the issue. On issues having to do 
with the institutional structure of the EU and the role of subnational 
governments within it, subnational governments may develop a common 
position. They form a variety of loose and opportunistic alliances, often with 
subnational governments in other countries, to better compete for EU fundino 
including particularly, funding for industrial reconversion and funding f~; 
transborder regions. Several regions and localities also share office space and 
even personnel in Brussels. Usually these offices represent subnational 
governments in the same country, but there is one case of a transnational off· 
ICe, 
set up by Essex and Picardie. Block analysis of data gathered in a survey of 
subnational offices in Brussels reveals that the informal networks they form with 
each other are particularly dense among offices in the same country, so there is 
strong national basis to regional interaction26• We also find that these offices 
interact intensively with EU institutions, particularly the Commission. 
On many issues subnational governments are intensely competitive. They are 
in continual competition for EU spending, and this leads them to compete for 
prior knowledge of funding opportunities, privileged access to information 
contacts with private industry, and access to regional coalitions21. Region~ 
representation seems to be driven by a dynamic of competitive mobilization and 
counter-mobilization across and particularly within countries that induces 
regional governments to establish offices so as not to be at a relative 
disadvantage in competing for scarce resources. 
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Transnational associations 
The past decade has seen the emergence of a diverse and growing number 
of overarching and specialized transnational organizations representing 
subnational governments, including the Assembly of European Regions, the 
Council of European Municipalities and Regions, the Conference of Peripheral 
Maritime Regions, the "Four Motors for Europe," Eurocities, the Association of 
Regions of Traditional Industry, C-6 (a network of six French and Spanish 
Mediterranean cities), the European Association of Border Regions, the Union 
of Capital Regions, associations covering the western, central, and eastern Alps 
and the Pyrenees, the Association of Frontier Regions, and the Coalfields 
. th 28 Communities Campa1gn, among many o ers . 
The Assembly of European Regions was founded in 1985 by nine 
interregional associations and in 1993 was made up of delegates of 235 regional 
parliaments representing around 80 percent of EU population
29
• The blind spots 
are in Ireland, Greece, the United Kingdom (mainly the southeast) and Denmark. 
The organisation has developed a close working relationship with the 
European Commission, particularly in the area of structural funds, but also on 
institutional issues. It has pushed for increased involvement of regions in 
European decision making, pressing for a Committee of the Regions, Article 
146, and the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty. The 
AER was instrumental in the practical preparation for the Committee of the 
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Regions, although its relations with the new body have become tenuous . e 
Assembly seems set to become a more traditional interest group organisation as 
the Committee of the Regions gains greater standing. 
The Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), which was 
founded in 1951, is the European section of the International Union of Local 
Authorities (IULA). Although its name (dating from 1984) suggests differently, 
it really represents local interests. Its role on the European arena is similar to 
that of the AER. 
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Alongside the AER and the CEMR are more functionally specific 
transnational networks. Some have been created expressly by the Commission 
and are attached to a specific Community programme or initiative. These include 
associations for objective 2 regions and for objective 1 regions, and narrower 
networks purpose built around Community initiatives like Leader (local networks 
in rural areas), Rechar (conversion of coalmining areas), Retex (textile areas), 
or Renaval (shipbuilding)31 • Some are composed of regional governments, 
others of local authorities. 
In addition, the Commission runs specific networking programmes that are 
not limited to structural policy. One is the Exchange of Experience Programme 
(EEP), to aid transfer of know-how between developed and disadvantaged 
regions, which was initiated by the European Parliament in. 1989 and then 
adopted (and part-financed) by the Commission. To receive EU money regions 
from at least three different countries have to design a joint year-long program. 
In 1993 there were 60 such projects involving more than 100 of the 183 regions 
in the EU. 
Recite (Regions and Cities of Europe) was launched in 1991 by the 
Commission to fund thirty-seven subnational networks focussed on self-help 
exchange programmes. For example, Roc Nord allows Danish subnational 
representatives to share know-how in economic and environmental planning with 
Crete. The Quartiers en crise project links 25 cities on problems of social 
exclusion and Dionysos pools technology among ten French, Italian, Spanish 
and Portuguese wine-growing regions. 
These programs involve the peak subnational organizations. The AER helps 
the Commission oversee the Exchange of Experience Programme, and the 
CEMR acts as the intermediary between the subnational authorities and the 
Commission on Recite projects. 
A second set of networks has its origins in self-directed mobilization ~mong 
regions with common territorial features or policy problems. Networks in this 
category include the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), the 
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), the three Alpes 
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associations, the Working Community of the Pyrenees, the Working Community 
of the Jura, and the Association of European Regions of Industrial Technology 
(RETI--in fact regions in industrial decline). Analyses of such organizations are 
scarce32• 
A crucial factor determining their effectiveness as lobbyists is their capacity 
to recruit widely. And here, most associations face a dilemma. On the eme hand, 
the European Commission has consistently been reluctant to deal with narrow 
organisations33 • On the other hand, th~ Commission is unable to reward 
organised members and 'punish' non-organised actors; it is committed to a 
generally applicable and objective policy. That confronts an association often 
with serious collective action problems, which are worsened by the fact that 
potential members are usually very unequal (from local to regional authorities, 
and from weak to very strong authorities) and that there is often no concrete 
agenda. Regions are therefore not keen to invest energy in a difficult enterprise 
knowing that they would benefit anyway from the association's eventual 
success34• 
The large encompassing associations do not face these collective action 
problems to the same degree. Even though the diversity of members and 
interests often causes significant strains within the organisations, they have been 
accepted by the Commission as the most representative interlocutors for 
subnational interests. The AER runs now a few policy-specific networks on its 
own. In 1989, it started eg. the Interregional Cultural Network (ICON) for the 
exchange of information and the implementation of joint projects. It has 
intensified collaboration between the European regions' cultural administrations. 
In 1993, it received some funding from the EU (AER documentation). Similar 
initiatives emerged around local authorities associations over the past twenty 
years. 
The networks in this second type seem to share a concern to reduce 
disparities or imbalances. Most focus on, or include, less well-off areas of the 
European Union, which often are in desperate need for EU money for 
restructuring and development. Hence, they represent the bottom-up cohesion 
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by subnational authorities, but have in the process become dependent on 
European Commission. 
The last category of networks has emerged from a position of strength in the 
.Hurop,ean Union. The most famous example is the Four Motors arrangement 
between Baden-Wiirttemberg, Rh6ne-Alpes, Catalonia and Lombardy, which 
combines the most dynamic regions in their respective countries. The purpose 
of the 1988 agreement is to promote technological collaboration, research and 
development, and economic and cultural exchanges. The signatories of the 
agreement explicitly endorse greater European integration. Wales established 
Jinks with the four in 1990 and 1991. Essentially, the regional governments act 
as brokers, who set a broad regulatory framework and bring interested parties 
together, while the decisions about possible collaboration are mainly left to 
business or other private actors. Other examples are the Euroregio partnerships, 
such as the Euroregio encompassing the dynamic three-country meeting area of 
Maastricht (NL)-Liege (B)-Hasselt (B)-Aachen (G)-Cologne (G). On the local 
side, many longstanding town-twinning schemes have been extended to 
economic partnerships and trading and technology transfers. The open-textured 
nature of networking makes it very difficult to come up with reliable data on the 
density of the networks. The British Audit Commission estimated that 22% of 
the British local councils are involved in programmes outside the structural 
funds35• 
This third category of networks is more driven by a market logic. 
Subnational political leaders and civil servants act as 'ministers of external 
trade' for their subnational territory. That role is in line with the current 
paradigm in regional development policy, where subnational political leaders are 
expected to act as brokers rather than development planners36• The success of 
brokers does not depend on their having direct control over services, but on their 
political connections with those controlling services and money. In other words, 
leaders from Baden-Wurttemberg do not have to create new services nor spend 
large sums on projects, but mobilise resources from the private sector and from 
the European coffers. 
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Conclusion and evaluation 
The institutional changes outlined above have brought subnational actors 
directly into the European arena. Central states still provide important arenas for 
subnational influence, and, as we have stressed, the participation of regional 
governments at the European level reflects their institutional capacity within 
their respective political systems. But central states no longer play the critical 
role of intermediary between subnational government and international relations. 
That is to say, subnational governments are no longer nested exclusively within 
states. They have created dense networks of communication and influence with 
supranational actors, particularly the Commission, and with subnational actors 
in different states. There is no hard and fast line for subnational governments 
separating their respective state arenas from the European arena. European 
integration is domesticating what would previously have been described as 
international relations. 
The outcome of this process has been extraordinarily messy, and it is not 
captured by the notion of a Europe of the Regions or even by federalism.
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There is no overarching model of governance across the member states, but a 
variety of mutually exclusive models with widely different conceptions of how 
authority should be organized territorially. Even the basic units of subnational 
governance are widely divergent. As a consequence of this, the mobilization of 
subnational units within the EU varies enormously from country to country, and 
even within countries. Hence, representation of subnational governments in 
Committee of the Regions is disparate and contested. Territory matters more 
than any other basis of identity in the emerging European polity, but once we 
probe beneath the shell of central states, there are no common principles of 
political organization that might provide a coherent basis for a European polity. 
It is possible to argue that this is merely a transitional phase in a process of 
convergence. Subnational governments in several countries are now in routine 
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communication with each other. Where regional governments are weak or 
absent, as in Greece, Ireland, or Portugal, subnational officials who participate 
on the Committee of the Regions can see close at hand the power~ wielded by 
regional actors in Spain or Germany, and they may demand the same for 
themselves. There are strong grounds for expecting diffusion as an unintended 
outcome of multi-level governance. But one would also expect that where 
institutional reforms are generated, they are assimilated within the particular 
context of the country concerned. 
Multi-level governance in Europe is a result of two sets of developments, 
European integration and regionalism, that converge in pulling decision making 
away from central states. What we are currently seeing is a messy process of 
deconstruction and reconstruction, rather than the replacement of one stable 
political order by another. Territorial relations throughout Europe are moving, 
rather than fixed, targets. We suggest that far from being a transitory situation, 
this is a fundamental feature of the European polity. Multi-level governance 
describes a patterning of authority that is unstable, contested, territorially 
heterogeneous, and non-hierarchical, rather than stable, consensual, territorially 
uniform, and hierarchical. 
Territorial relations between states and the EU and between states and 
regional movements turns on normative issues as well as power. Which levels 
of authoritative decision making are appropriate for which issues? How should 
governments at different levels relate to each other? How, in short, should 
political authority be organized? These are complex, contested, and enormously 
consequential questions that go beyond basic distinctions between liberalism and 
authoritarianism or democracy and dictatorship. Democratic theory has much 
more to say about the rights and duties of citizens and the conditions under 
which divergent interests should articulated, aggregated and mediated, than about 
the territorial dimension of political life, including how to determine boundaries 
of political units, levels of decision making, or interaction of subnational 
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governments. Historically, democracy developed hand in hand with liberal 
nationalism, and one legacy of this has been the presumption that the nation 
provides the rational shell for authoritative decision making. 
While there is deep and broad consensus on the virtues of liberal democracy 
in Europe as in other advanced industrialized societies, there is little consensus 
on the territorial organization of the state or the degree of autonomy that should 
be given to ethno-cultural minorities. All EU member states share the basic 
features of liberal democracy. But they vary enormously in their territorial 
organization, from decentralized polities, such as Spain, Germany and Belgium, 
to centralized ones, such as Portugal, Greece, or Ireland. 
Recent attempts to provide guideposts for territorial distribution of political 
competencies are fraught with ambiguity and contention. The most commonly 
discussed principle in recent years, subsidiarity, poses a straightforward 
principle--decentralization to the lowest feasible level--but provides few clues 
concerning what is feasible. Subsidiarity, as revealed in the negotiations leading 
to the Maastricht Treaty, is notoriously ambiguous in practice. 
While we diagnose some common directions of development, there are few 
grounds for supposing territorial convergence in the EU. The powers of 
subnational governments vary immensely across the member states, from 
financially, politically, and organizationally entrenched Belgian regions, German 
Lander, and more recently, Spanish communidades autonoll!as, to weak, poor, 
and organizationally unarticulated subnational governments in several countries 
on the periphery of the EU. The territorial pattern of regional mobilization is no 
less variable. The powers of subnational governments and the degree of regional 
mobilization vary within the European Union about as much as any political 
variable could vary. 
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We have argued that territorial relations across the EU are being transformed 
in ~ays that one can generalize about: central states are losing their control over 
ma~or areas of decision making; new opportunities have been created for 
regiOnal mobilization; innovative, transnational, patterns of interaction have been 
est~blis~ed among actors at several levels of government; and peripheral 
natiOnalists have been confronted with a new context in which they have had to 
re-ev~uate their strategies and goals. The result, as we conceive it, is the 
unfoldmg of common threads of change against a background of · · 
. . ImpreSSIVe 
variation. 
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Annex 1: REGIONAL OFFICES IN BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER 1993 
LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION 
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 
BELGIUM 
Vlaams Gewesri 
Region Wallonne 
Bruxelles-Capitale 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
SPAIN 
Baden-Wiirttemberg 
Bay ern 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Bremen 
Hessen 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Thiiringen 
Andalucia 
Catalufia 
Galicia 
Madrid4 
Extremadura 
Pais Vasco 
Comunidad Valenciana 
-Murcia 
Canarias5 
NUTS 3 Other 
Aarhus2 
Aalborg2 
Ocit;nse2 
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FRANCE 
ITALY 
UNITED KINGDOM 
North of England 
Northern Ireland 
Scotland 
Wales 
Nord Pas-De-Calais6 
Alsace 
Bretagne7 
Cote d'Azur 
Martinique 
Pays de la Loire7 
Picardies 
Rhone-Alpes 
Bouches-du-RhOne 
Manche Exp~sion9 
yorkshire and Humberside 
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Cornwall and Devon 
East Midlands 
Essexs 
Highlands & Islands 
Kent 
Lancashire 
Strathclyde 
Surrey 
Centre-
Atlantique10 
Grand Est11 
Grand Sud12 
Mezzogiorno14 
East of Scotland 
Notes for Annex 1 
At this time of writing Flanders has not selected a representative for this· office. 
The Danish offices represent towns rather than NUTS regions and are not listed by 
A.R.E. or the Conseil de la Region Bruxelles-Capitale list of regional offices. 
The Hanse office represents Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein. 
Madrid is also a NUTS l and NUTS 3 region. 
The Canary Islands is also a NUTS 1 region. 
Nord Pas-De-Calais is also a NUTS 1 region. 
Bretagne and Pays de la Loire share an office 
Picardie and Essex share an office 
The Centre Atlantique office represents Poitou-Charente, Centre, and Castille-Leon. 
1o The Grand Est office represents Champagne-Ardenne, Bourgogne, Lorraine, Alsace, and 
Franche-Comte. 
u The Manche Expansion office represents Manche. 
12 The Grand Sud office represents Acquitaine, Mid-Pyrenees, Languedoc-Roussillon, 
Provence-Alpes-Cotes d' Azur, and Corse. 
13 The Lazio office is funded by private firms rather than the regional government ofLazio. 
14 The Mezzogiorno office is funded by the Italian state, not regional governments. 
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_ Second Thoughts -
The Committee of the Regions after its First year 
Thomas Christiansen • 
Introduction 
The Single European Act created a fundamentally different e~vironrne~t for 
. •• Th Single Market programme with Its prorruse to 
regwnal governments . e . 
. al fr ntiers to the four freedoms - the free movement of capital, 
open natiOn o . . 
. od d ple - changed the basic assumptions about the operatiOn 
serv1ces, go s an peo 
of regional economies (Jensen-Butler, 1987; Prodi, 1993; Begg, 1992). 
b Of crucial institutional and procedural reforms - the Furthermore, a num er . . . . 
enlargement of community competences, the extension of maJOnty votmg m the 
Council and the systematic use of regulatory competition - demonstrated that a 
. . . f bl" policy-making was now moving outside the control of 
s1gruf1cant part o pu 1c 
domestic actors (Dehousse, 1992). In addition, the 1988 reform of the structural 
funds as well as their doubling in size raised the significance of Europe~ 
policy-making for the large number of regions concerned (Marks, 1992, 
Tommel, 1992). 
The combined effect of these developments has been that regions have 
become not only aware of the significance of the Communit~, and ~as also 
<>enerated an intense interest in participating in European pohcy-mak~g and 
~ . . b "ldm· g Apart from an exorbitant rise in informal lobbymg, the 
mst1tut10n- m . 
creation of hundreds of regional "information offices" in Brussels and the 
• Department of Social and Political Sciences, European University Institute, 
Florence. 
" · al" ·s used here and in the following as 
•• For the sake of convenience, the term regiOn 1 . . l "ts If and when 
. al 1 al ell as intermediate temtona um . an umbralla, denoting regiOn . ' oc as w th diverse level the terms will be used 
there is a need to differentiate between ese ' 
indivudually. 
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forging of trans-European alliances and networks, there was also a demand for 
an institutional presence in the structure of the Union. Once the Treaty revision 
leading to Maastricht began in the early 1990s, r_egions across the Community 
specified their expectations. In particular the German Lander - whose 
participation in domestic policy-making is most entrenched and who could 
threaten to veto the ratification of the reformed treaty - irlsisted that the creation 
of a regional chamber or a regional council was put on the agenda. Thus the 
German government was obliged to carry these demands into the IGC and was 
ultimately able to sway other, more sceptical Member State representatives. The 
'need' was for the creation of a consultative body that would formulate and 
represent thyse regional interests on the European Union level. In Article 198a 
of the Maastricht Treaty a "Committee of regional and local bodies, hereinafter 
referred to as "the Committee of the Regions", [was] established with advisory 
status. 
Further stipulations in this article included the following: 
"The members of the Committee and an equal number of alternate members 
shall be appointed for four years by the Council acting unanimously on 
proposals from the respective Member States. Their term of office shall be 
renewable. 
The members of the Committee may not be bound by any mandatory 
instructions. They shall be completely independent in the performance of 
their duties, in the general interest of the Community." 
As indicated above, the establishment of a Committee of the Regions (CoR) 
was ultimately the result of the transfer of competences to the European arena. 
Over the years - and again with Maastricht - the European Union (EU) had 
acquired a policy-making role in a growing number of fields (Dehousse, 1994). 
Many of these new powers bordered on or even invaded the responsibilities of 
regional governments in at least some Member States, in particular in Belgium 
and in Germany. In this context the creation of a consultative body representing 
regional and local government contained the promise that lower levels would be 
more directly involved in decision-making processes which concerned them but 
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from which they had so far been excluded. In other words, CoR presents 
regional actors with an additional channel of representation that might be more 
effective that previous alternatives (Hooghe, 1994; Conzelmann, 1994). For the 
supranational institutions the creation of such a Committee was attractive 
because it carried the advantage of added legitimacy to European policy-making 
while its advisory nature carried little potential for obstructing d~cision­
processes. On the national level CoR was less welcome since its very 
institutionalization and the required decisions regarding its membership meant 
that difficult questions had to be answered. Some of these answers might 
(re)open Pandora's Boxes in some Member States' territorial politics -politics 
which had already exhibited considerable tension since the mid-1980s (Rhodes 
and Wright, 1987). As it happened, the extended period of domestic deliberation 
about the make-up of the Committee demonstrated more clearly than before both 
the potential for 'Europe' to intrude into hitherto guarded areas of national 
politics as well as national governments' ability to exert considerable control 
over the unfolding of this process. 
A preliminary assessment must therefore take account of this context of 
tension. Expectations about the evolution of CoR were divided between those 
who- in the words of Jaques Delors- were "pinning unduly high hopes" on the 
new body, and those "viewing [it] warily" (Delors, 1994). This "double 
challenge" put CoR between the promoters of a regional body within the EU 
institutional structure and those fearing a delegitmization and/or further 
fragmentation of EU policy-making, on the other. 
The more extreme opinions in this regard demonstrate the range of 
expectations that surrounded the establishment of the new Committee. The 
(over)optimistic view of CoR's value is perhaps best captured in one of the 
numerous declarations of a meeting of European Regions: 
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" ... The delegates expect, that the [CoR] will from the start vigorously 
use all its political resources in all areas, so that the now existing 
opporturntles for influencing [EU] decision-making will be utilized 
exhaustively .... [Since regrettably not all demands have so far been 
fulfilled], they demand at the next Treaty revision ... co-decision powers 
in addition to the consultative role and the right to bring cases to the 
European Court" (Assembly of European Regions, 1992). 
The contrasting flavour of exaggerated fear about the damage CoR might do 
to the established Community structure can be sampled from the heated debate 
in the British House of Commons: 
"The [CoR] could, at best, be a waste-of-time, quango-type talking shop, 
but at worst it could be the means by which the European Community 
will seek to bypass the [British parliament] (Mrs T.Gorrnan, MP (Con) 
for Billericay)" (House of Commons, 1993: 1052). 
"Is it not also possible that this Committee of the Regions might turn out 
to be able to bypass the House [of Commons] ... It is a way in which the 
Community can end up saying it has authority to act in a particular way 
while leaving the House entirely out of it (Mrs T.Gorrnan) 
" ... in line with the point made [above] that the nation state itself and its 
own status are at risk, the Committee of the Regions ... [is] the nucleus 
of a new unitary state in Europe. In other words, ... [are we] acquiescing 
in a unitary vision of the European Community .. ? (Mr. W.Cash, MP 
(Con) for Stafford)" (House of Commons, 1993: 1029-1030) 
As will be argued below, the experience so far suggests that neither the 
'positive', functional thesis nor the 'negative', fragmentation thesis hold true: 
substantive regional interests - whether collective or individual - have so far not 
been served effectively by the new Committee, and its establishment has not 
made the European policy process more difficult. Still CoR has been at the 
centre of regions' interests. This apparent paradox is explained by the significant 
impact the Committee has had on a symbolic level. 
In the following the article will sketch out the recent trends along these lines 
of development. An analysis of the potential cleavage-lines running through the 
Committee will address both the functional and the fragmentation argument, 
while a subsequent section on legitimacy gains deals with the normative claims 
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and the issue of symbolic politics. By way of conclusion the article will evaluate 
the experience so far and the expectations regarding the 1996 IGC. 
Cleavage-Lines in the Committee 
Looking at divisions within CoR might seem strange against the frequently cited 
image of a "Europe of the Regions" (Clement, 1991; Bullmann and Eille"l, 1993; 
Hebbert, 1989). This image, transmitted by the political discourse, is one of 
harmony and unity of sub-national governments in their struggle for direct 
representation in the Community. In this context the very establishment of CoR 
is sometimes attributed to the common front of regional representatives, 
organised in the Assembly of European Regions (AER) and the Council of 
European Municipal and Regional Authorities (CEMR). The exponential growth 
not just of individual regions, lobbying efforts, but also of the intensity of 
collective lobbying through such transnational associations is to a large extent 
responsible for the increased attention that regions have received from EU 
policy-makers in the 1990s. Numerous potential conflicts remained covered 
under a thick layer of rhetoric, yet the discourse about a vertically harmonious, 
regional Europe became dominant in the 1990s (Borras et.al., 1994; Hainsworth, 
1994). It took the disagreements and conflicts surrounding the establishment of, 
and the work in, CoR to demonstrate to a wider public that European regions 
could well be divided and noncooperative. 
Search for conflict is an agreed way of analysing institutional contradictions. 
That is why below the work of this new EU institution will be studied by 
looking at its - potential or actual - cleavages. Such structural divisions could 
be expected along any of the following lines: 
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local v. regional representatives 
Left v. Right party politics 
urban/industrial regions v. rural regions 
'executive' regionalism v. 'deliberative' regionalism 
Northern v. Southern regions. 
Local v. Regional 
Trans-European associations of regional and local authorities had already clashed 
before work began. Major issues of discontent concerned their respective 
membership and the statute of the Committee. It was among their representatives 
that a previous, advisory body - established by the Commission in 1985 _ had 
been divided.~ a number of Member States- Germany, France, Belgium being 
the most promment examples- the regional-local divide was the main difficult 
1 . y 
in the se ect10n of members for CoR (Hesse, 1993). Consequently, the 
expect.ation has been that this would turn out to be one of the main dividing 
Jines m CoR (van der Knaap, 1994). As it happened, local and regional 
delegates, which are about evenly represented in CoR, have been able to avoid 
a split and agreed on a rotating presidency. The President of Languedoc-
Roussillon, Jacques Blanc, backed by the majority of 'weaker' AER members, 
was elected President for the first two years, to be succeeded afterwards by the 
current Vice-President and Chairman of the CEMR, Pasqual Maragall. 
On the whole, therefore, the disagreements and institutionalized divisions 
between local and regional level representatives which had marked the initial 
phase of CoR have not been reproduced since the Committee set to work. The 
split envisaged by some into local and regional sections - even leading to two 
separate committees with the former advisory council continuing to function 
with a purely local membership - has not come about. The reasons for this are 
not so much in an unexpected outbreak of consensualism between the two 
levels, but rather in their own internal heterogeneity. 
. In f~c~, ~he work of the Committee did rather rapidly expose the apparently 
lmear diVISion of its membership into a "regional" and a "local" government 
c~p - institutionalized in AER and CEMR and thus reproduced in the public 
dtscourse - as a myth. For one, the whole issue of local v. regional is diffused 
by the rather large number of intermediate authorities which to some extent 
combine the features of regional and of local government. This group includes 
the German Kreise, the French departements, the Italian, Spanish and Dutch 
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· h B ·t· hand Irish counties and the Danish amtskommuner. This provmces, t e n 1s 
diverse make-up of CoR is illustrated by the table below: 
Member State Local Intermediate Regional 
Austria 3 - 9 
Belgium - - 12 
Denmark 5 4 -
Finland 7 1 1 
France 6 6 12 
Germany 2 1 21 
Greece 12 - -
Ireland 2 7 -
Italy 7 5 12 
Luxembourg 6 - -
Netherlands 6 6 -
Portugal 10 - 2 
Spain 17 - 4 
Sweden 12 - -
UK 16 8 -
Total 110 38 74 
In addition, local government representatives from those member states not 
possessing a regional level could be expected to represent also so~e regional 
interests, at least in those cases where they actively campmgn for the 
establishment of regional institutions. Local councillors from Wales and 
Scotland, for example, would be counted as 'local' members, even though some 
of these delegates to CoR perceive their voice as one for their region/nation, 
rather than for their respective local government. 
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Expectations of a serious local-regional split (v.d.Knaap, 1994: 90-93) have 
been proven wrong because, quite simply, territorial interest formation does not 
follow the size of the units, but the distribution of resources and competences 
across different levels. This distribution is not a priori given. Unlike the size of 
units, which may be clearly determined, it is constructed in the political and 
constitutional process. Size and function sometimes run in tandem, but rarely so 
much as to allow for a clear-cut overlap of interests from one Member State to 
the other (Engel, 1993). When interests are structured conflictually, we witness 
considerable confrontation even within the same level of government, as the 
problems of German fiscal equalization after unification show (Exler, 1992). 
Naturally, an unproblematic and stable cooperation of either regional or of local 
government across the EU is even harder to imagine. Across Western Europe 
the result of such diversity of interests is the patchwork of local, intermediate 
and regional government which is reflected in CoR's mixed membership. 
Differences within the AER resulting from the diversity of 'regional' interests 
had already become apparent at the 1993 AER plenary in Barcelona. 
The interests of sub-national governments are therefore so diffused that any 
one-dimensional demarcation into "local" and ''regional" must turn out to be 
flawed. By contrast, the ability of either group to form stable alliances is 
severely restricted. Consequently, '1ocal" and ''regional" positions which 
appeared clear before CoR began its work were bound to collapse. In its place, 
more transient alliances, coalitions and oppositions, based on fundamental 
political or economic cleavages in Western Europe, have appeared. 
Left v. Right 
There is a recognition of party political affiliations of Committee members in 
that, for example, socialist and EPP members of CoR meet in a party caucus 
before plenary sessions. Even before its constitution there had been party-
political squabbles about CoR membership in the UK and in Portugal (Hesse, 
1993). Moreover the envisaged presidency rotation from Blanc to Maragall takes 
into account not just local-regional, but also left-right ties that CoR has to 
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represent, very much in the fashion of the European Par~i~ent. _Party politics 
did play a role in the competition for the Presidency, but 1t d1d ult~ately reveal 
how weak party ties are in CoR. Scottish Labour delegate Gray withdrew from 
the four-way competition in order not to divide the Left vote, but subsequently 
the sole remaining Socialist candidate Maragall ignored the decisions of his 
political group and agreed with Jacques Blanc on the Presidency swi_tch-over 
after half-term. Thus the use of established party political procedures was 
attempted, but, due to lack of cohesion of the political groups, has so far failed 
b ·gnif· t Equally in the formulation of opinions, it is difficult to to ecome s1 1can . , 
see disagreements generated by a left-right nexus among the regions. So far 
there are no instances in which the party political affiliation has overridden other 
sectional interests so as to influence the outcome of voting in the chamber. 
In addition, what is viewed in a the national context as a split along a left-
right dimension has on the European level so far proved to be the 'grand 
coalition' of European People's Party and European Socialists. As in the 
European Parliament these two groups for the time being also cooperate in CoR 
with the aim of increasing the power of the institution as such. Such 
bipartisanism is a general feature of El.: ;;olitics, facilitated also by the generally 
weak position of political parties in the EU system and in the conse~sual nat~re 
of 'government by committee' - the dominant feature of EU pohcy-makmg 
which is often characterized by the term 'comitology' (Bach, 1992). 
Nothing so far indicates that CoR does not follow this trend. If anything, the 
consultative nature of its activity and the cross-cutting cleavages running through 
its chamber suggest that a partisan division into Left and Right is even less 
probable here than in other European institutions. 
Urban v. Rural 
The most significant policy area that has so far attracted the attention of regional 
and local interest representation is Community regional policy and related 
fmancial disbursements to subnational authorities. Divisions in the Committee 
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might have been expected along the lines of the "objective" areas among which 
the structural funds are shared. After the 1988 Fund reform, which had created 
the five objectives, and especially in the run-up to the 1993 reform,_alliances of 
regions defending the interests of 'their' objective began to form. In particular, 
intense lobbying for more funding to either industrial (objective 2) or rural 
(objective 5b) was the result. The emergence of a sectoral, regional alliance -
RETI - that worked to defend the funding for, and involvement of regional 
governments in, Objective 2 aid, is the best documented example (McAleavey, 
1994). But similar developments have been observed in rural areas (Andy Smith, 
1994). Consequently, regional policy deliberations in CoR were expected to 
bring this diversity of interests to the fore. 
But while EU structural policy was meant to become one of the prime issues 
in the work of CoR, the major reform of the funds had just been concluded at 
the end of 1993 -concluded, as it happened, under intensive bargaining among 
national government representatives. As a result, little in the area of regional 
policy was left for CoR consultative process. A CoR opinion on the designation 
of Cohesion Fund programmes for Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland has been 
issued. Yet with this Fund so strongly oriented towards the national level and 
its financial parameters already fixed by the Council, there was little space for 
controversy within CoR. 
Faced with an empty plate, CoR members went in search of business and 
have in the meanwhile delivered a large number of "Own Initiative Opinions" 
on a variety of issues, most of which had little or nothing to do with the specific 
economic interests of the respective subnational units. CoR's potential divide 
into industrial and rural, centre and periphery, or high-tech .and declining regions 
has therefore been deflected. 
Executive v. Deliberative Regionalism 
Surprisingly perhaps for some, a split occurred not between regional and local 
representatives, but within the regional group. More specifically, there was a 
division between what could be called strong and weak regional governments. 
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This division was an expression of the diversity of constitutional and legal 
responsibilities among regions in Western Europe, and the resultant differences 
regarding their administrative culture and practice (Engel, 1993). 
Clearly, within the universe of sub-state government in the EU the German 
Lander are on a different planet when compared to UK counties or 
Luxembourgeois municipalities. But also within the strictly regional group -
Austria, Belgium, Germany. Spain, France and Italy - serious variation remains. 
Here one can distinguish between administrative or executive regionalism on the 
one hand, and parliamentary or deliberative regionalism, on the other. In the 
former, the emphasis of regional activity lies in the execution and administration 
of public policies, sometimes legislated for at higher levels, whereas for the 
latter the regional institutions are mainly a place for debate and deliberation with 
only very limited policy-making competences. Comparison of the number of 
administrative staff or the regional share of public spending give a clear 
indication of this distinction. 
Members from these different types of regions brought into CoR the 
experience and the habit of their domestic environment. As a result, the 
Committee experienced a clash between those regional representatives that 
usually rely on a larger bureaucracy and with a broad range of policy-
competences - namely those from Belgium, Germany and Spain - and those 
whose activity at home centred on the work of a regional or district assembly. 
More than a struggle between 'regional' and 'local', or left and right members, 
Jacques Blanc's election as President was thus much more the victory of a 
"councillor"-type regional president over an "administrator"-type regional prime 
minister (the Flemish candidate van den Brande). Ironically, it was the 
'stronger', executive regions- which had pushed through CoR in the first place-
that were now in the minority and lost out in a number of institutional choices. 
The most important of these was the issue of CoR members being 
represented in plenaries and Commission meetings by delegated deputies. This 
is long-standing practice in, for example, the German Bundesrat, and a similar 
CoR procedure was somehow taken for granted by the German members. On 
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this understanding the Germans, the Belgian and the Spanish regions had 
selected a high-ranking membership list for CoR which included, for example, 
from Germany, four regional Ministerpriisidenten, and, from Belgium, 
practically half the Flemish cabinet. Spain had also sent regional heavyweights 
including the Catalan President Jordi Pujol (who is also president of the AER), 
the Galician president Fraga Iribame and Barcelona's mayor Maragall. The idea 
was obviously to grace CoR with important political persona, while detailed 
consultative work would be transferred to delegated officials or the CoR 
administration. In the event, both these possibilities were ruled out. The CoR 
administration did not become a policy-making nucleus with specialized know-
how, remaining instead comparatively small in size and recruiting staff mainly 
on the basis of links to members rather than relying on experience in EU policy-
making. And the CoR majority voted to not allow elected members the 
delegation of their participatory and voting rights to subordinate officials. 
_This di~ ~ave serious repercussions for the work of the members _ mostly 
regwnal Irumsters - from Germany and Belgium. Used to the delegation of 
powers to, and constant advice from, a large number of specialized staff, they 
were now less able to participate effectively. Due to, above all else, time 
pressures, attendance of these members sank and so did, consequently, their 
influence - through argument and through vote - on CoR opinions. A forceful 
illustration of this trend was given during the December 1994 plenary session 
when a controversial draft opinion on the wine market came to a vote. The 
German and other 'Northern' members opposed the Opinion that was seen as 
benefitting Mediterranean wine-growers, but lost the related vote. One of the 
reasons for the defeat was their number being reduced by absenteeism. 
In this way differences in administrative traditions, policy styles and, 
ultimately, constitutional prerogatives translate into conflicts over policies and 
institutional choice. What CoR exhibits in such cases is the general tension 
between, on the one side, the great variance of intra-state arrangements in 
Western Europe and, on the other, the requirement for uniform procedures at the 
European level. It is a conflict that is also visible in other European institutions _ 
Parliament or Commission, for example - and might well be stimulating due to 
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mutuallearrting of the participants. However, if and when politics are locked in 
a bargaining or conflictual mode of decision-making - as opposed to being 
concerned with problem-solving - inefficiencies and suboptimal outcomes can 
be expected (Scharpf, 1988). The difficulties in the cooperation between 
executive and deliberative forms of regionalism indicate that problem-solving 
is so far not the normal mode of CoR decision-making. 
North v. South 
A broader fault-line than the one above has already been implicitly referred to: 
the difference in interest and style between 'Northern' and 'Southern' regions. 
These are less analytical categories than empirical groupings, owing their 
emergence to the overlap of a number of cleavage lines. One can distinguish 
regional and local government activity between North and South through 
constitutional factors such as tax-raising powers, size of budgets, extent of 
competences, and legislative powers as well as the general disparity in economic 
and geographic structure, distance to EU core markets, etc. Obviously, in a 
number of cases there are exceptions - namely the strongly institutionalized 
regions in Spain and those without political institutions in the UK and in Ireland 
- , but on the whole the political, fiscal and economic potency of subnational 
government is greater in the North than in the South. One illustration of this is, 
for example, the presence in the South- France, Italy, Spain- of what has been 
called the "Napoleonic" or prefect model: the presence of central government 
officials and institutions on the regional and local level (Sharpe, 1988). 
'Northern' states, by contrast, generally look to or co-opt local government for 
the execution of central policies. 
The overlap of diverse economic interests and distinct constitutional regimes 
makes for a difficult cooperation across this dividing line. Surely some sort of 
modus operandis will be found, but there is detectable disenchantment on all 
sides about the difficulty of bridging the division. As it has sunk in among 
members and their decision-makers that the mere existence of CoR is no 
guarantee for a convergence of styles or of interests, it also becomes clear that 
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the operation of the Committee will not be as smooth as, say, the German 
Bundesrat or the US Senate. The disagreements resulting from economic 
disparities and of diverging constitutional systems are therefore likely to remain, 
and could become one of the more durable features of the work of CoR 
(Kalbfleisch-Kottsieper, 1994). 
CoR as a Collection of 'Member State Delegations' 
Implicit in most of the above observations has been the continuing significance 
of differences between Member States rather than between regions as such. 
, Since the distribution of competences, the fiscal powers, the macroeconomic 
context, and the size of administrations are derived from the respective Member 
State's domestic system, regions are exhibiting their similarities and differences 
primarily with regard to their national environment, and less of their own right. 
What this means is simply that CoR is less a Committee of Regions than a 
'Committee of Member State Representatives'. It was already conceived as such 
in the Maastricht Treaty, which defined the membership along national lines. 
Subsequent practice has shown that allegiance, interest and practicality often 
force regional deputies to form national 'delegations'.~These are perhaps not 
very cohesive, but at any rate they frequently seem to be overriding other, trans-
national alliances or divisions in case of conflict. 
The internal structure of CoR reflects the significance of the 'national' 
variable. Official publications of the Committee, including its own press 
releases, indicate the origin of individual members and the membership of the 
Bureau solely in national terms (CoR, DG for Press and Communication, 1994). 
Further evidence of this development is the creation of 12 commissions to 
prepare the work of the Plenary (eight full commissions and 4 sub-
commissions). This number is designed to allow each of the 'national 
delegations' one chair. The fact that there is perhaps not enough subject-matter 
to justify this number of commissions - which is bound to increase to 15 after 
the recent enlargement - is indicated by the fact that "Regional Development" 
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(COM 1), "Spatial Planning" (COM 2), "Urban Planning" (COM 4) and "Land-
Use Planning" (COM 5) are more than well covered. 
One can conceptualize this 'nationalisation' of CoR as the result of two 
state-building processes dominated by regionalization and 'state socialization'. 
As regards the former, the intimate relationship between decentralized 
government and the state has frequently been noted in the literature (Keating, 
1991; Loughlin, 1994; Sharpe, 1988). Regionalization in the 1970s and 1980s, 
for example, is often seen as a response to 'overload' on the part of the welfare 
state (Ashford, 1988; Balme et.al, 1994; G.Smith, 1981). The central state, faced 
with diminishing ability to fulfil commitments and control policy-output, 
engages in the creation of lower levels of governance as a means of diffusing 
protest, improving planning and enhancing support. Even though this is only part 
of the story, it still leads one to an understanding of "region" which is 
inseparable not just from the respective national context, but also from the very 
structure of the state in which the region is located. Regionalization and the 
resulting regions are then seen to be an element through which states - while 
adapting to a changing environment - maintain their central position in the 
structuring of political life (Cerny, 1990). 
'State socialization' is meant to describe here the way in which political 
rules, norms and styles - informal patterns of behaviour as much as formal 
procedures of policy-making - have over decades, even centuries, been 
structured by the respective state. Distinctive 'policy-styles' from one country 
to another have been the result (Richardson, 1982). These different styles, to be 
found also in the other European institutions (Christoph, 1993; Egeberg, 1995), 
unite CoR members along national lines and weaken the cohesion of 
transnational 'coalitions'. 
Considering the long-term effects of these processes of state-centred 
'regionalization' and 'socialization' on the operation of CoR, it appears as less 
of a paradox that the institutions which was meant to become a forum for 
regional cooperation has so far turned out to be a forum for the representation 
of Member State interests. 
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Legitimation and Symbolic Politics 
Despite the negative overtones above we have to recognize that even the 
nationally-skewed activity of CoR is more than just a collection of Member 
State representatives and interests, in the same way in which the EU at large 
must be understood as more than merely a Community of states. An important 
role of the Committee goes beyond the representation of political interests or the 
submission of policy advice. This is the question of symbolic politics and of 
legitimizing the actors involved and the EU policy-process itself. 
Legitimacy Problems of European Governance 
There is a fairly clear link between, on the one hand, the legitimacy crisis of the 
European project during the early 1990s (Weiler, 1991) and, on the other hand, 
the general desire to involve a wider range of policy-recipients in the process 
of policy-making (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). The accelerating intensity of 
European integration following the '1992 programme' required the mustering of 
additional support beyond the political class that had so far dominated 
Community decision-making. It went not, as was noted after the signing of 
Maastricht, as far as involving a regular dialogue with the European electorates -
in spite of the many declarations about the "citizen's Europe"; the tenuous link 
between the European Union and 'the people' became clear once it came to 
ratification. 
The referendum debates in Denmark, Ireland and France, as well as the 
extended public debate surrounding the parliamentary process in the UK and the 
judicial review of the Treaty in Germany, revealed deep-seated suspicions 
among the electorate about the direction of the European project. Clearly, 
regular elections towards a Parliament with limited powers, do not, any more, 
suffice to legitimize a system which to a large part of the public appears to 
combine technocratic, intransparent policy-formulation with the power-politics 
of Member State bargains. 
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The structure of the European Union being as it is, it is very difficult to 
conceive of alternative ways to legitimate it. Involving the public at large -
increasing, for example, the degree of direct participation of EU citizens, a 
frequent demand post-Maastricht (Murswieck, 1993) - is difficult. At the very 
least, a trans-European 'communicative space' that could host the necessary 
debate is lacking (Schlesinger, 1994). 
One attempted remedy has been the involvement in EU policy-making of 
what could be called 'intermediate level' actors- groups and institutions 'below' 
the state which are most directly affected by European legislation and by the 
restructuring of political opportunities and constraints. This development has so 
far included social actors - the Commission's attempt to establish regular 
dialogues with trade unions, European business and environmental pressure 
groups - as well as the territorial actors which are now represented in CoR. 
Often this was in connection with technical aspects of specific policies, in cases 
where effective regulation - efficient rules and substantial compliance with them 
- demanded the participation of local actors. As mentioned above, with regard 
to regions this was mainly in the field of regional policy, which after the reform 
of 1988 had become increasingly complex (Marks, 1993; Hooghe and Keating, 
1994). Apart from the opening up of a variety of channels this also included the 
creation of the Advisory Council of Local and Regional Authorities (European 
Commission, 1988). Less than actually "advising" the Commission or other 
Community institutions in the making of regional policy, the recognition has 
been that the legitimacy of this increasingly important policy area depended also 
on a structured public deliberation of its contents and the inclusion of elected 
politicians in this deliberative process. 
This specific legitimacy deficit results from the asymmetry of inputs and 
outputs in this policy process. On the one hand, there is the extremely 
technocratic and intransparent nature of Community regional policy, in which 
important decisions, also budgetary decisions, are made by administrators on 
different levels and by committees composed of them. On the other hand there 
is the political nature of much of the subject matter - redistributive fmancial 
transfers, economic development priorities, the sheer size of the structural funds. 
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Regular· and public meetings of elected, regional level representatives 
deliberating - being, in fact, "consulted" on - the issues involved could be 
expected to take some of the technocratic flavour away from this expanding 
policy, even though in practice the nature of policy-making might not change 
much. 
What was needed - and what CoR has subsequently provided - was a 
deliberative space that would demonstrate to the wider public that European 
integration and regional policy in particular are being dealt with by elected 
politicians and not by faceless bureaucrats. The legitimacy gain that European 
institutions as well as the regional actors could reap from such a perception is 
considerable. Commission President Delors stated the overriding importance of 
this function quite frankly in his opening speech to CoR first plenary: 
"The task of [CoR] is nothing less than to enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union ... That is why your Committee is so important: 
you will help to close the gap. Firstly, your involvement will bring the 
Union, perceived as being too distant, closer to local reality. You will be 
able to communicate local concerns and grass-roots reactions ... The other 
side of the medal is that you will have the task of explaining 
Community policies to the people back at home." (Delors, 1994). 
Summing up the argument resulting from these observations, one can say 
that if, firstly, effective EU policy-making is considered a common good, and 
if, secondly, added legitimacy improves the effectiveness of these European 
policies, then CoR can contribute significantly to the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the policy-process. The creation of the Committee is thus a 
case demonstrating the way in which European integration has a positive-sum 
logic. For it , is at relatively little financial and political cost - no large 
administration is necessary, no delays or blockages of policies are possible - that 
all actors involved gain substantially in their standing vis-a-vis their respective 
reference groups. Legitimacy is gained by all actors involved through the 
publicly documented cooperation: Commission officials and Council working 
group members, when faced with criticism of the "comitology" or "technocracy" 
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variety, can point to the body of regional representatives who have been 
consulted on a given issues. The latter, in turn, when faced with local 
disenchantment over controversial policies emanating from the "distant 
Brussels", can argue that they have been in Brussels doing their best for the 
respective local interest. In any case they will claim the credit for EU subsidies 
being channelled to "their" region (Keating, 1994), but apparently h~ve now 
more reason to do so. 
The Symbolic Politics of Regions in Europe 
This legitimising role of CoR might seem at odds with the previous conclusion 
that its representative and consultative functions are largely flawed. Yet there is 
no contradiction. While democratic procedures and efficient governance are 
certainly factors that legitimize systems of rule, they are not the only ones. In 
the realm of identity politics, in particular, the use of symbols and rituals has 
been an important source of legitimate rule (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
Without going into details here, it may be noted that historical as well as 
contemporary regional movements make intensive use of symbols and rituals in 
their discourse and political practice (Bourdieu, 1991). In fact, the construction 
of nation-states is intimately linked to the symbols associated with respective 
nationalisms (Anderson, 1983). And, since the 1970s the traditionally fragile 
legitimation of EC policy-making has been met not just with policies and 
institutional reforms, but also with the promotion of an increasing number of 
symbols and symbolic acts (European flag, anthem, passport, driving license, 
cultural capital, youth orchestra, woman of the year, etc.). Thus there is 
widespread recognition of the value of symbolism in what has been referred to 
as European 'identity policies' (de Witte, 1987). 
The limited success to date of these 'identity policies' indicates the size of 
the problem: 
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"how far can [the EU] induce in the great majority of Europe's 
populations a sense of commitment and passion towards a European 
identity? ... there seems to be as yet a very deep and clear gulf between 
the aspirations for political (and economic) unity of Europe and the 
development of a genuine European cultural identity which can ~ompete 
in popular consciousness and loyalties with deeply rooted national 
affiliations ... can this commitment be generated, or must we wait for it 
to 'grow' ... ? (Anthony Smith, 1994) 
The special relevance of CoR lies in this respect, occupying, as it does, the 
intersection of both regional and European identity formation. It is an example 
for what Smith has called "the creation of supra-national facts" which are 
supposed to entail rather then presuppose certain social or political 
developments. It is in this respect that - regardless of practical or substantial 
problems - the creation of an official, public arena for both Europe and the 
regions is so significant. Given, for example, the difficulties of even identifying 
a European level of regional government, the mere existence of CoR fills this 
gap and conveys an image of uniformity. Thus the legitimacy of EU regional 
policy - partially based on the pretence that there is a regional level of 
government - is greatly assisted. 
On the other end of the policy chain, regional decision-makers - who are, as 
we have noted above, often closely linked to, and dependent on, .central state 
administrators - gain in stature by exhibiting their apparent independence in 
Brussels. Now regional representatives have, in addition to their previous, purely 
informal lobbying efforts, an official mandate within the institutional structure 
of the Union. In regional politics, more often than not, compromises with higher 
levels of decision-making have to be struck. As a result, the authority of 
regional politicians and institutions might be progressively undermined. In this 
context, the newly won celebrity of "going to Brussels" on behalf of the region 
is a valuable asset in the construction of the 'self-determined region'. Regional 
authorities which in many cases came into existence only in the last couple of 
decades are now demonstrating their significance with a bargaining role not just 
in domestic politics but also in the processes at the European level. It is hard to 
think of an action that would have a stronger impact on the consolidation of 
regional power structures. And, as this is about symbolic action, this effect of 
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CoR membership is not, at least in the short term, obviated by the fact that the 
'European presence' of these regional representatives says little about their 
actual involvement in, or their impact on, EU decision-processes .. Precisely 
because so much of EU policy-making remains intransparent and hidden, the 
creation of a symbolic arena for regional participation in EU politics must be 
seen as an important innovation. 
After all, it would be impossible to understand the intense interest in, and 
the conflicts about, CoR membership in most Member States, if the function of 
the Committee was seen as merely consultation and representation. The crucially 
added value of CoR was the added legitimacy its creation delivered to those 
consulted and those being consulted alike. 
The Impact of CoR: Influence or Irrelevance? 
The previous discussion can now be related to the expectations and fears 
mentioned at the outset of this article. Has CoR the potential for significantly 
influencing EU decision-making? Has it raised the profile of EU politics and 
thus helped the Union's legitimacy? Has it done much to improve, or endanger, 
the established institutional structure of the Community? What are realistic 
expectations for the 1996 Treaty revision? The following sections will briefly 
assess the impact CoR has had on these questions. 
Policy-Making and the Legislative Process 
Analysing the impact on the policy-process of the more than 20 opinions CoR 
has so far produced is difficult. For one, most of the related legislation has not 
yet been finally adopted. It remains to be seen, therefore, how much CoR 
opinions will be taken into account by the other EU institutions. Commission 
and Parliament had both claimed, before CoR's creation, that they were taking 
an active interest in the opinions of subnational government. After Maastricht 
it is questionable how much of this interest survives the competition with these 
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institutions' self-interest. In this regard it is worth noting that the increasingly 
important relationship between these two institutions has in recent years become 
more confrontational (Westlake, 1994). This makes it unlikely that in the current 
climate of two-dimensional tension - between EU and Member States, and 
between Commission and Parliament - the voice of CoR will find many 
supporters on either side. 
Another difficulty lies in the nature of CoR opinions adopted so far. Most 
of these are actually positive about the proposed legislation, and offer as 
comments only very general recommendations of improved involvement of 
subnational governments. These opinions allow little impact-assessment, since 
they often don't require explicit changes in the piece of legislation under 
discussion. 
Finally, CoR has made some choices which are bound to reflect negatively 
on its ability to influence EU policy-making: the exclusion of civil servants, the 
emphasis on deliberation and debate, the partisan nature of some its opinions, 
the wide range of subject matter addressed. This means that the representative 
mode has been preferred to the consultative, and that consequently CoR would 
have to rely on power rather than on persuasion to get its opinion across. 
Clearly this choice is at odds with the as yet absent power the Committee has 
to force changes in the proposed legislation. This option is somehow based on 
the anticipated extension of powers at the 1996 IGC, with a view to some sort 
of co-decision arrangement or even the creation of a Third Chamber. This 
anticipation will be discussed below. 
Institutional Structure 
From the observations in this article it follows that CoR does not constitute a 
major disturbance to the Union's institutional structure. Initial fears that CoR 
might be able - consciously or not - to block decision-making by not delivering 
the required opinions seemed to be confirmed when it got off to a late start, 
rescheduling the inaugural session repeatedly, even though the delay in the 
ratification has added another year to the preparations for this new body. As it 
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happened, CoR has willingly delivered its opinions and sought to do so within 
the set time span. Domestic or internal procedures of consultation - as, for 
example - the involvement of regional parliaments and their committees - have 
suffered, since it was these rather than the dispatch of opinions that were cut 
short. 
A second cause for concern lay in the relationship between CoR and its 
sister organisation, the Economic and Social Committee. A Maastricht Protocol 
stated that the two were to share a common administrative structure, but as a 
matter of course squabbles broke out between the Committees, as between them 
and the Council, about the organization of this common administration. It 
became generally accepted, though, that CoR would have its own Secretary-
General and its own Press, Documentation, and Research Divisions, while it 
would share more technical tasks (printing, translation, catering, security, etc.) 
with the ESC. ESC and CoR subsequently cooperated on the budget proposal 
which included limited joint and larger separate expenses. The Council accepted 
this division, but overturned the emphasis, creating a larger joint and smaller 
separate budgets. CoR's original budget proposal of 26.4m Ecu was reduced to 
an actual 15.7m Ecu in the 1995 budget, whereas the requested 37.8m Ecu for 
the common administrative structure was increased to 57.7m Ecu. Therefore, 
while the EU expenditure has almost doubled - from 56m Ecu for the ESC in 
1993 to 99.7m Ecu for ESC and CoR together in 1995 - Council maintains 
considerable control over the way in which the additional money is spend. 
On the whole, the impact of CoR on the Union's institutional structure is 
still a potentiality which largely depends on the reforms envisaged for the 1996 
InterGovernmental Conference. Soon after its inauguration the CoR began to 
prepare its own agenda for 1996, setting up a special commission. This is 
chaired by Jordi Pujol and has so far come up with proposals for the a re-
definition of the subsidiarity principle and the right for CoR to call upon the 
European Court of Justice should this be violated (Hrbek and Weyand, 1994: 
156). In view of the generally hostile climate to further integration, these 
demands are widely seen as utopian. 1996-1997 is not expected to offer major 
advances to the powers of European institutions, and the initial claims for co-
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decision powers for CoR or the elevation to becoming a 'Third Chamber' have 
gone. As the general trend in integration is tow-;:ds consolidation after a period 
of turbulence, CoR can not hope for more than a mere acknowledgement of its 
role. Even Parliament and Commission, which in the run-up and the run-down 
to Maastricht were favourable to more regional powers, will not spend valuable 
resources on demanding litigation rights for body with unpredictable majorities. 
After all, these litigation rights are bound to be used against the • older' 
institutions themselves, as any increase in CoR voting power carries with it the 
danger of harming vested interests and established procedures. 
The open question regarding the 1996 IGC is the way the EU can address 
the issue of democracy, participation and the citizen's Europe. As indicated 
above, it is in this respect that serious fissures in the European construction have 
been revealed after Maastricht, and this issue will need to be addressed if any 
other changes are to be carried. And it is in: this respect that CoR was supposed 
to make an impact: helping to legitimize policy-processes and the activity of 
other actors involved. 
As was discussed earlier, there have been developments to aid the 
legitimation of EU policy-making. CoR has offered a public forum where none 
existed before in which solely the concerns of lower levels of governments are 
aired. Yet, in terms of the Union's 'democratic deficit', the utility of the new 
body depends on the actual linking up of social and political life in the 
localities. The following section on public discourse will briefly look at the 
impact CoR has had in this respect. 
Public Discourse 
The expectation - cited also by Jacques Delors at the outset of this article _ was 
that a new regional body would bring the discussion of EU matters down to 
local level. Evidence on the way CoR has brought this about is mixed. As the 
evolution of public discourses is a long-term affair, a few remarks shall suffice 
here. 
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A collection of press reports (CoR, Press Book, 1994) indicates two 
developments. On the one hand there appears to be-an increase in the discussion 
of European matters in the regiqnal and local press. Even if not always positive, 
this is at least the beginning of a wider, active 'engagement' of the European 
public, which is generally deemed necessary to solidify the institutional 
superstructure of the Union. In this respect it seems that CoR has fulfilled one 
of its designated functions, even if the actual increase in discussion can only be 
determined through more extensive, quantitative research. 
The other development detracts a little from this positive view, because the 
way CoR and the Union at large are actually portrayed in this wider public 
debate is very inconsistent and piecemeal. It is here that the 'national' as 
opposed to 'regional' membership of CoR takes its toll. For clearly not every 
locality has a member in the Committee, since the constraints of national quotas 
of membership have meant that many members represent associations and 
collectivities of districts, towns or counties. Consequently, many municipalities 
remain without a CoR member and thus without any increase in EU interest in 
the local media. 
Finally, a critical question remains about the assumed link between CoR 
delegates and their publics. Not much is known about the general incidence of 
this link. But evidence from the UK, for example, indicates that the political 
links between local government and citizens are much less structured than the 
respective ties to Members of Parliament. Local election turnout is usually less 
than half that reached at parliamentary elections. It is worth querying, at the 
very least, the actual closeness between CoR members and their reference 
groups at home. And with regard to the kind of substance that CoR has sought 
to address in its debates, it may be asked further, whether activity in the CoR 
has not damaged rather than helped this supposedly close relationship between 
local and regional politicians and their electorates. More precisely, the question 
is whether socialization in CoR has not led members to become 'out of touch' 
with 'their people'. But this, too, can only be stated hypothetically. More 
extensive research is required to substantiate these concerns. 
58 
Concluding Remarks 
At the outset we mentioned that expectations about the work of CoR had been 
divided between positive - benefits for the EU derived from its consultative 
function and benefits for regions from its representative function - and negative -
risks about the fragmentation of the policy process and the potential obscurity 
of regional demands. Summing up the present analysis we can say that neither 
thesis has so far been validated. 
The effectiveness of consultation remains limited, since the expertise for 
persuasive policy-advice is present in the Commission or in the regions itself, 
but is not associated with the Committee as such. The value of CoR as a 
representative organ of regional demands is limited due to the divisions that 
have opened within the membership on policy as well as on institutional choice. 
While numerous opinions have been drafted and adopted, they have no visible 
influence on the decision-making by the institutions to whom they are addressed. 
Disagreement within CoR has at times been great, but that has neither slowed 
down the EU machine as whole, nor even blocked CoR itself. There is a 
learning curve among participants which includes also the realization that 
conflict is part of inter-regional cooperation; it remains to be seen the 
consequences of this realization are going to be adaptations of style and 
procedure or, whether, on the other hand, disenchantment with the difficulty of 
reaching consensus within CoR and the impossibility of commanding authority 
within the Union will ~urn Members and the public away from the new body. 
The "added value" of CoR, insofar as it can be assessed, lies in the way in 
which it aids the legitimation of the complex European policy-process. European 
institutions and regional representatives derive this benefit out of their mutual 
recognition. Most of this is symbolic, yet it is precisely this 'symbolism of 
significance' which is of great value to both regional and European institutions 
alike. 
The near future will put to the test the arrangements of CoR which have 
come under the strain of its diverse membership. The attributed legitimacy gain 
of the Committee is ultimately a short -term phenomena: unless political practice 
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1. d with the image of active involvement of regions in soon becomes a gne 
this image is bound to lose its value. Political symbols, European governance, . 
1 h ely On a minimum of substance for their reproductiOn and here as e sew ere, r 
· Thi nn· plies that sooner rather than later the Committee and the reconstructiOn. s 
EU at large must address the question of whether the emphasis of its work is.on 
1 · d the provision of specialised expertise or on the representatiOn consu tauon an 
f art. 1·onal m· terests Some consistency with regard to either one ur the o p 1san, reg · . . . 
other role is necessary _ for both are largely incompatible - If the nnage ~f an 
actively involved regional level is to gain substance and therefore. also w~1ght. 
If ot the outcome might be a shift towards the pessimistic scenano mentiOned 
at ~he, outset. The exposed 'facade' of regional participation might delegi~i~ze 
the EU's policy-process and instutional structure further, while the cont~umg 
inability to bridge their differences might increase splits am~ng regiOnal 
governments, endangering their cooperation even in other fora. This would then 
lead to increasing fragmentation and obscurity. 
None of these trends are as yet probable, but as this article has tried to 
show, the potentiality is present in some of the choices already made. Yet there 
is still sufficient space for the actors to steer the ship into different ports. The 
future must show whether _ the optimistic scenario - the symbolic power 
near ak. 
of "regions in Brussels" can be converted into substantive policy-m mg 
advantage for the European Union and/or its regions, or whether -. the 
pessimistic scenario _ the widening gap between public claims about regiOnal 
involvement, on the one hand, and the lack of power to actually fulfil these 
promises, on the other, will lead the new body into obscurity. 
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Political Authority and 'Knowledge Authority': 
A Distinctive Role for the Committee of the Regions? 
Anthony Barker 
This paper considers the Committee of the Regions as an advisory body within 
the context of governmental advisory bodies in general and the theory and 
practice of advice-giving to governments as a whole. It concludes that whatever 
authority a formally designated official advisory body may come to enjoy is 
most likely to be based on its perceived expertise (or its perceived access to 
expertise in others). If the CoR is likely to fmd it hard to compete with the 
Parliament of the EU and its regional affairs committee in the political sense, 
then it may make a stronger mark by becoming the acknowledged arena and 
repository of the best available information and analysis on EU regional issues. 
Such perceived expertise would entail specialising in these issues and avoiding 
party political controversy whenever possible. Neither of these conditions would 
be easy for a committee of elected political figures to meet, particularly when 
the regions in question (in all their variety) will be engaged in an increasingly 
zero-sum competition for EU funds. 
The academic study of the institutions and processes of officially-mandated 
advice-giving to governments is one particular approach, among others, to an 
understanding of how governments devise their formal policies and informal 
positions on issues. It has some particular claim to attention, partly because it 
has been neglected as a facet of public policy studies, but mainly because it is 
a broad approach to policy-making which puts it into the wider context of that 
particular national political system. Observing and comparing how policy advice 
' Department of Government, University of Essex, Great Britain, and British Council 
Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, 
USA, 1994-5 
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is officially solicited or received places the focus of enquiry midway between 
the government departments who receive advice and the mainly private or quasi-
private sources who provide it: industry, commerce, professions, academia. 
From this mid-point between official and unofficial worlds, a view can be 
taken of the official political system's culture: how open is it to outside stimuli 
or even challenge?; how transparent is it in its receipt and treatment of outside 
advice?; how rigid in the face of outside challenge to policy and thus how likely 
actually to shift its position because of contrary but convincing advice received? 
Looking in the other direction, outward towards the private and quasi-private 
world, an equivalent view can be taken of the character and quality of that 
political system's non-state civil society. How well developed, how self-
conscious or confident, how well imbued with a sense of public service so that 
the government is not left without specialist advice which it ought rationally to 
receive (whether it appreciates or welcomes this fact or not)? 
Each country has its own traditions and level of achievment in these terms 
of a pro-active society whereby groups and interests with particular information 
and insights will feel both a right and a duty to supply these to the government, 
offering some particular balance between substantive information and policy 
opinion for the government's consideration. The achievment of a self-confident 
and genuinely pluralist (independent) supply of unofficial advice and information 
to government (which can then be fed into the supply of official advice which 
the government itself arranges to receive) varies widely, even among countries 
which can claim democratic status. 
At the one extreme, it is notorious that a former dictatorship, with no 
democratic experience in general, such as the Russian Federation, will find it a 
long and gradual process to develop the basic features of a civil society, such 
as private bodies which take some positive interest in political and government 
issues and a free press and broadcasting system. Until these exist in a healthy, 
self-conscious and confident condition, the flow of unofficial advice and relevant 
information on public policy will inevitably be poor and the substantive support 
for officially-arranged advice (that is knowledge and analysis which is arranged 
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by government but generated outside the government's own circles) will 
therefore also be only meagre. At the other extreme, a system such as Sweden's 
provides (in the 'remiss' procedure) for automatic opportunities for private 
bodies to offer their unofficial advice and associated arguments or information 
to their government before official policy is made. Getting fairly close to that 
standard of participation and exchange, in some fields of federal and state 
government at least, is the US case. Procedures for "notice and comment" 
inform the public of impending issues by official notice and hundreds or even 
thousands of memoranda and letters may be submitted, containing advice and 
information from many angles and interests. Combined with a rich tradition of 
public hearings (and such processes as official meetings of local government 
authorities where the local residents can address and even debate with the 
elected representatives) this mass of paper provides a powerful stream of 
unofficial advice to decision-makers in the American case. In different degrees 
and manners, major European states such as the UK, France or Italy occupy 
places between these extremes of high or low 'private plural advice' flowing 
into the government's work. The UK, for example, is very rich in its civil 
society institutions and their willingness to address the government, with or 
without an invitation, on the merits of policy. But the formal institutions of both 
central and local government are rather conservative and stiff (even 'stiff-
necked') on the processes themselves. Thus the formal 'public inquiry' is a 
high-quality but rather rigid institution, normally confined to specific cases for 
official decision rather than embracing broad public policy issues. Likewise, 
local governments do not allow members of the public to address them in formal 
session, preferring (sometimes) to hold public meetings where elected 
councillors can speak and listen to local people on the issue in question (which 
usually relates to town planning and land use). 
- 0 0 0 -
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In analysing 'decision advice processes' for governments, a basic distinction is 
to be made between officially requested and --linrequested advice. If the 
government requests it on a particular subject it may be obliged, or may prefer 
' to arrange for it directly, by establishing a commission or committee to gather 
and analyse information and (usually) to make recommendations -- or it may 
activate an existing commission to do this. If, by contrast, the advice is 
umequested it can flow in from any non-governmental source, including some 
which a government would deliberately not approach or encourage, such as its 
party's political rivals or socially disfavoured groups such as local organisations 
of prostitutes or former or current prison inmates. 
These latter exceptions apart, a representative government is usually glad 
enough to receive unsolicited advice from as wide a range of private 
organisations as may exist and which may, out of civic duty or self-interest, 
decide to send in a document. These typically include associations of 
professionals, labour unions. trade associations (representing businesses in 
industry or commerce) churches or innumerable specialist organisations with 
some interest to advocate or some particular information or experience to offer. 
This process of government agencies gathering in relevant information and 
advice may, as already noted, be arranged with support of a commission of 
inquiry on a particular issue (which would then produce public recommendations 
to the government) or, less formally, be part of a consultative routine based on 
a government memorandum which may outline several policy options and 
request "interested parties" (meaning involved organisations, not other political 
parties) to respond. This "going out to consultation", as it is known in British 
government, or 'notice and comment' procedure (US) is more clearly under the 
government's control than employing a public commission or committee because 
there is no such intermediary body preparing to give the government highly 
publicised advice in the form of its recommendations in its report. (Setting up 
a public committee with a view to receiving certain pre-ordained 
recommendations, which can then be used to legitimate policy decisions, is of 
course one of the arts of modern government; but doing so and then having to 
68 
deal with quite different, unpredicted and unwelcome recommendations from the 
~vnittee is one of the hazards.) cou.u•~ 
In being willing to receive, and sometimes to request and arrange, unofficial 
advice from outside its own ranks, a democratic government in a pluralist 
political system society is sh~g in ~e benefits offered by ~ more-~r-less 
thriving civil society. It recogmses that It has no monopoly of informatiOn or 
. sight into the myriad problems of an advanced industrial society, notably on 
:chnical and professionalised issues or public services, where the detailed facts 
or work experiences may be difficult and subtle as well as elaborate -- such as 
medical or social work professionals dealing with (say) abortion counselling or 
AIDS treatments. Nor can it hope fully to have covered all the details of issues 
which lie at the local level and yet which remain wholly or mostly the 
responsibility of national government. 
As public issues become more technically demanding and those responsible 
for dealing with them become more professionalised in the organisation of their 
work, self-conscious policy networks are increasingly prominent in these 
processes which generate policy-related information, technical skills and 
authoritative advice are offered to the state and, in effect, exchanged for some 
measure of official legitimacy when all this material is received into its agencies 
or departments by the government. Private bodies earn public status by being 
seen to originate and offer material which the government recognises that it 
needs in order to meet a policy challenge -- particularly where the issues are 
technical and obscure or novel and unfamiliar, or both. This exchange of 
knowledge and status is collaborative: not the dealings of the ruler with the 
ruled. Nor do the government's internal expert advisers on such extremely 
difficult technical issues assume a superior, hierarchical position towards their 
professional peers (doctors, accountants, scientists, nuclear engineers, et al.) who 
work outside government and who are engaged in presenting information and 
advice to their civil service colleagues -- if they are realists, at least. It is a 
commonplace of organisation studies involving scientific creativity and 
innovation that new approaches, discoveries and additions to best technical 
practice are more often made outside government laboratories or research 
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establishments in the less formal atmosphere of either academic life or unofficial 
scientific centres. Government scientists usually look to non-government 
colleagues to learn the latest ideas or developments. This long-established 
perception (which led the US Air Force to create the RAND Corporation as an 
applied research think-tank deliberately outside its own organisational boundary 
after the Second World War) strengthens yet further the idea of authority and 
status being bestowed on the sources of vital information and technical atlvice 
which governments realise that they need. 
If this 'knowledge legitimacy' rests on technical authority and access to 
essential information, then the more familiar concept of political legitimacy rests 
on representative authority. A committee of elected public representatives 
(usually sitting as a committee of the national, state or local government's 
legislature) possesses a quite distinct type of authority involving no claims to 
technical expertise or professional or other practitioner experience. It needs those 
things to be offered to it in 'evidence' if it is engaged in either legislative 
scrutiny or reporting to the public on some policy issue. Without such input it 
remains helpless, with only the ideological and other personal views of its 
members as a basis for forming a joint report. As a scrutiny or investigative 
committee, this would be inappropriate, so it must gather information and advice 
to fuel its work. By contrast, 'the -experts' in any field have 'knowledge 
legitimacy' (taken together as a group, even though they will only rarely fully 
agree) but, of course, are not elected representatives. As in their relationship 
with the government itself, they will seek to exchange status for knowledge with 
such a committee of elected politicians. 
- 0 0 0 -
The Committee of the Regions is very unusual in being composed of elected 
persons, which gives it a measure of representational legitimacy, while being 
given an advisory role, which usually entails obtaining (or already possessing) 
some level of 'knowledge legitimacy', based on recognisable substantive 
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expertise. In order to be a success as an EU institution, therefore, the Committee 
will need to make a mutually beneficial link between itself and the 'knowledge' 
or 'policy communities' which can deal authoritatively with the EU's 'regional' 
problems. This could not be at all easy until these regional issues become less 
varied as between the member states and less vague as a concept with which a 
practical senior body such as CoR can actually deal. 
Of course, the Committee can claim both political and substantive collective 
knowledge of the EU's various perceived 'regions' because its members are 
elected by various types of constituency within those areas of their respective 
countries. It is hardly a committee of neophytes with regard to EU regional 
issues. But it is not as well-based politically as it might be if maximum 
representational legitimacy was either its aim or the governing EU institutions' 
purpose. Its members are not elected directly by the voters onto this committee: 
they are either the individual nominees of higher political authorities within the 
member states or they have been nominated ex officio following election 
elsewhere. So even their nomination lacks a special regional base (that is 
nomination by and from the most suitable elected public authorities existing 
within one or other regions in their member country). As a result they are in 
virtually the same political position as their closest rivals, the regional affairs 
committee of the Parliament, but will always lack the background authority of 
being a committee of that more senior and longer-established EU constitutional 
element. Indeed, the entire Parliament is too close for comfort as a comparison 
to the CoR's status as an advisory body of elected persons: it was not long since 
that the Parliament itself was not much more than an advisory body (and some 
critics maintain that it is still not today and may not be for some time to come). 
Obviously, when the EU's would-be legislature has itself so recently been close 
to a merely advisory role, it will not be enthusiastic about a rival political focus 
for one of its principal policy interests: the EU's role in the 'regions' of the 
member countries (however they may be defined or enumerated). 
If the CoR's political legitimacy based on its representational authority will 
be hard to establish because of the close rivalry of the Parliament and its 
regional affairs committee, an alternative basis for legitimate authority in the 
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eyes of the other EU institutions may be worth seeking. As this essay has 
implied, this would seem to be some attempt to provide the EU with a powerful 
source of the best available information and analysis of its regional problems. 
The value of such an input would grow as the zero-sum character of regional 
funding becomes ever more plain and the political conflicts more fraught -- so 
long as an impartial and expert-based service by CoR could be maintained in 
such a rising political temperature, which would indeed be very difficult: 
Perhaps the elected status of the CoR's members might be turned from being 
a liability (which it is vis a vis their rivals in the Parliament) into an unusual 
asset by adding to its political legitimacy as a committee of elected persons the 
'knowledge legitimacy' which would come from sponsoring and brokering a 
supply of technical, detailed information about the regions which was not 
otherwise available to the EU's main institutions, at least in that ready form, and 
which they therefore may come to rely on -- to the political and institutional 
credit of the CoR. As noted at the outset of this essay, this novel role of 
stimulating, co-ordinating and analysing the best available technical information 
on regional affairs would achieve authority only if controversy -- particularly 
partisan controversy -- was minimized and this would be hard for a committee 
of elected politicians to achieve. A solution would be to insulate the 
Committee's own meetings from its work as an organiser of valuable 
information on whose quality its reputation within the EU and its member states 
may come to rest. If the Committee could operate a technical panel (or even 
itself meet in 'executive session' and apolitical mode) to develop this 
information and research work, it might still enjoy its more political character 
in normal 'plenary session'. But it might reflect that there is no lack of opinions 
and special claims about regional issues already available within the EU and its 
member states: and that its voice is the newest and least well-established. 
- 0 0 0 -
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To conclude, therefore: the Committee's very unusual standing as a body of 
persons elected by the public (albeit for a different purpose and in a variety of 
different interest constituencies) but asked to perform only an advisory role is 
a difficult one, certainly while the shadow of the Parliament over its functioning 
as a political forum on regional affairs is so apparent. But if the CoR could link 
together a novel degree of expert-based substantive (or 'knowledge-based') 
authority or legitimacy with the political legitimacy it enjoys as elected persons, 
it could differentiate itself from the Parliament and enjoy an authority of its 
own. To try to become the conduit for all or most of regional issue analysis 
going on within the EU (even if only in the sense of collating, processing and 
projecting it in usable and scrupulously objective form to the other institutions 
of the EU and to member states) would be a difficult but worthwhile endeavour. 
For the Committee to combine political legitimacy with 'knowledge legitimacy' 
by coming to preside over a respected information function would constitute a 
singularly useful role. To focus on expert information and analysis could lead 
towards the CoR becoming a unique (because politically legitimate) 'think-tank' 
for EU regional affairs. Eschewing party politics when performing this function 
must seem to elected politicians a high price to pay. But if the market in 
political opinions within the EU on regional problems is already fully supplied 
by the Parliament, its regional affairs committee and the fifteen national 
legislatures, it may be better for CoR, to try to become something other than just 
another (probably rather marginal) opinion machine. 
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The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: 
Background and Performance 
John Kincaid' 
The basic weakness of advisory commissions or consultative bodies is precisely 
that they are advisory. They can be, and often are, ignored by policymaking 
institutions. Consequently, the fundamental challenge for an advisory body is 
to make its voice not only heard but also heeded by policymakers. 
The Origins of ACIR 
The United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR) was established in 1959 by an act of the U.S. Congress signed into law 
by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Essentially, five factors stimulated the 
creation of ACIR. 
First, ACIR' s establishment reflected both hope and anxiety about the 
profound changes in the balance of power in the American federal system 
produced by (1) Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal 
response to the Great Depression of the 1930s and (2) the national mobilization 
for World War TI. Perhaps the best single indicator of the change was the 
altered fiscal position of the governments in the federal system after the war. 
In 1927, federal government spending accounted for only 31 percent of all 
own-source government expenditures in the United States, compared to 52 
percent for local governments and 17 percent for state governments. The federal 
share, however, increased to 50 percent by 1940 and to 72 percent by 1952, then 
• Robert B. and Helen S. Meyner Center for the Study of State and Local Government, 
Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania 
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dropping back to 65 percent by 1957, at which time states accounted for 16 
percent of all own-source government spending while local government's share 
had plummeted to 19 percent. Fiscally, the federal system was turned upside 
down. The federal government toppled local government from its more than 
300-year reign as the dominant fiscal presence in American life. 
Second, the rise of federal fiscal power was accompanied by unprecedented 
federal policy activism, particularly economic regulation and social 
redistribution. Although these New Deal and wartime "welfare state" policies 
were modest compared to the policy standards of many European nations, they 
were regarded--both positively and negatively--as well-nigh revolutionary in the 
United States. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed its historic doctrine 
of dual federalism by ruling in 1941 that the Tenth Amendment (1791) to the 
U.S. Constitution is merely "a truism."· No longer would the Tenth Amendment 
(which reserves to the states or to the people all powers not delegated to the 
federal government) stand as a judicially protected "states' rights" barrier against 
federal policymaking. 
Third, President Eisenhower and many other Republicans were appalled by 
these developments. In a 1957 speech to the nation's governors, for example, 
Eisenhower compared the increasing power of the federal government to "the 
dark background of Eastern Europe ... the results of extreme and dictatorial 
concentration of power." He then predicted that "if present trends continue, the 
States are sure to degenerate into powerless satellites of the National 
Government in Washington.•••• 
• United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
" William G. Colman and Delphis C. Goldberg, "The Eisenhower Years and the Creation 
of ACIR," Intergovernmental Perspective 16 (Summer 1990): 20. 
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Many Democrats, however, saw in the new federal arrangement 
opportunities for social reform. In their view, the rise of federal power 
represented not a usurpation of state power but a necessary majoritarian and 
democratic response to long-standing failures of the states to address urgent 
public needs, including the problems of big cities. Many Democrats, especially 
northern liberals (in the American sense) regarded the new power of the federal 
government as a weapon to be wielded against the evils of big business and 
reactionary state policies, such as racial segregation. 
Fourth, having been toppled from its position as the preeminent government 
for citizens, local government sought to institutionalize a new position for itself 
as the "third partner" in the federal system. Given that the U.S. Constitution is 
silent about local government and that, legally, local governments are creatures 
of the states, American federalism had been understood historically as a 
federal-state relationship. During the New Deal, however, big-city political 
bosses (who were mostly Democrats) had gained increasing access for local 
governments to intergovernmental bargaining in Washington, DC. Local 
officials, along with many congressional Democrats, sought thereby to redefine 
federalism as a cooperative federal-state-local partnership. 
Lastly, the national associations of state and local officials--such as the 
National Governors' Association, National Association of Counties, and U.S. 
Conference of Mayors--did not yet have a strong institutional presence in 
Washington, DC, in 1959. Although state and local officials lobbied in 
Washington, often successfully, they sought more formal, institutionalized means 
of extracurricular representation in federal policymaking. 
As a consequence of these factors, Eisenhower had pledged, during the 1952 
presidential campaign, to establish a temporary commission on 
intergovernmental relations to recommend reforms. The commission was 
established in July 1953 and issued a final report to the president and the 
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Congress in 1955. Not entirely satisfied with the commission's modest 
recommendations, President Eisenhower joined with the nation's governors to 
form a Joint Federal-State Action Committee in 1957, which also issued 
recommendations, some of which were implemented by the president or enacted 
into law by the Congress. For example, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was 
amended to give state governments a larger role in promoting and regulating the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
As a result of these developments as well as extensive congressional 
hearings on intergovernmental relations, the Congress enacted a statute to 
establish a permanent commission on intergovernmental relations. Thus, ACIR 
came into existence in September 1959. 
The Legal Status of ACIR 
Legally, ACIR was established as a permanent agency of the federal 
government; however, the commission belongs to the category of "independent 
agencies" in the federal government. That is, ACIR is neither a line agency of 
the executive branch nor an agency of the legislative branch. The commission 
is free to determine its own agenda, and it reports its findings and 
recommendations both to the president and to the Congress. Neither branch of 
government can directly control the commission's work. 
The president's ability to influence ACIR comes mainly from his authority 
to appoint 20 of the commission's 26 members. In turn, the Congress' influence 
over ACIR stems mainly from the authority of the House and Senate to appoint 
three members each to the commission and also to appropriate the funds for 
ACIR's operating budget. 
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The power of the president was dramatically illustrated during President 
Lyndon B. Johnson's tenure when, angered by an ACIR recommendation in 
support of federal general revenue sharing for states and localiti~s, Johnson 
refused for a year to appoint a chairman for the commission, thus preventing 
ACIR from holding official meetings during that year. 
The power of the Congress has been reflected in its declining support for 
ACIR since 1985. From 1959 through 1985, congressional appropriations for 
ACIR, which accounted for most of ACIR's budget, had increased gradually to 
a high point of $2.1 million in 1985. From 1986 through 1989, however, the 
Congress reduced its appropriations for ACIR by 53 percent. Congressional 
appropriations increased thereafter, but were reduced again to a mere $1.0 
million for 1995. 
Relative to the EU's Committee of the Regions, it is perhaps useful to note 
that ACIR was not established as a first or transitional step toward any intended 
or hoped-for fundamental constitutional or institutional change in the federal 
system that would enhance the legal position of regions, states, or localities in 
the American Union. ACIR was established as a permanent advisory body to 
the federal government, primarily to promote better intergovernmental 
cooperation. As such, ACIR also serves as a supplementary and official channel 
for injecting the views of state and local government officials into federal 
policymaking. 
The Mission of ACIR 
ACIR's 1959 enabling statute sets forth the following mission for the 
commission: 
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Because the complexity of modem life intensifies the need in 
a federal form of government for the fullest cooperation and 
coordination of activities between levels of government, and 
because population growth and scientific developments portend an 
increasingly complex society in future years, it is essential that an 
appropriate agency be established to give continuing attention to 
intergovernmental problems. 
It is intended that the Commission, in the performance of its 
duties, will--
(1) bring together representatives of the Federal, State, and local 
governments for consideration of common problems; 
(2) provide a forum for discussing the administration and 
coordination of Federal grant and other programs requiring 
intergovernmental cooperation; 
(3) give critical attention to the conditions and controls involved in 
the administration of Federal grant programs; 
(4) make available technical assistance to the executive and 
legislative branches of the Federal Government in the review of 
proposed legislation to determine its overall effect on the federal 
system; 
(5) encourage discussion and study at an early stage of emerging 
public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental 
cooperation; 
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( 6) recommend, within the framework of the Constitution, the 
most desirable allocation of governmental functions, 
responsibilities, and revenues among the several levels of 
governments; and 
(7) recommend methods of coordinating and simplifying tax laws 
and administrative practices to achieve a more orderly and less 
competitive fiscal relationship between levels of government and 
to reduce the burden of compliance for taxpayers. 
In short, ACIR is authorized to investigate and make recommendations on 
virtually all aspects of intergovernmental relations. The only conspicuous 
omission from the mission statement is authorization to examine the role of the 
federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, in the federal system. 
Generally, ACIR did not address judicial issues until the 1980s.* 
ACIR's mission, moreover, is purely advisory. The commission has no 
authorization to promulgate or enforce rules or regulations or to engage in 
juridical functions. ACIR does, however, have limited authority to compel 
federal executive departments and agencies to provide the commission 
information necessary for ACIR to carry out its mission and to compel 
executive-branch civil servants to testify at commission hearings. 
The Members of ACIR 
ACIR consists of 26 appointed members, each of whom serves a two-year 
term on the commission. Because of interim turnovers of members during the 
years, all 26 members do not begin and end their terms at the same time. 
• ACIR, Reflections on Garcia and Its Implications for Federalism (Washington, DC: 
ACIR, 1986). 
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Consequently, the members' terms of service are staggered, and there is annual 
rotation of various members. In addition, a member may serve beyond two 
years until he or she is replaced by a new appointee. 
The membership of ACIR is also bipartisan; that is, both Democrats and 
Republicans must, by law, be represented on ACIR. The purposes of this rule 
are (1) to enhance the independence of ACIR against the party in power in the 
Congress and/or the presidency and (2) to enhance the non-partisan objectivity 
of the commission's work. 
Three members of the commission are private citizens appointed directly to 
ACIR by the president. By custom, presidents have, with one brief exception, 
designated a private-citizen member to serve as chairman of the commission. 
The assumption behind this custom is that a private citizen--unlike a federal, 
state, or local offic1al--can serve as a more neutral chairman of the commission, 
mediating among the claims of the federal, state, and local government 
members. Ordinarily, the private-citizen members of ACIR are supporters of the 
president and his political party; however, by tradition, the citizen designated as 
chairman by the president has usually been a prominent person possessing more 
of a civic rather than a partisan political reputation. 
The president also appoints three Cabinet-level officers to ACIR, ordinarily 
two Cabinet secretaries and the head of the White House Office of 
Intergovernmental Affairs. These three members, of course, are invariably 
strong, overt supporters of the president and his party. 
The U.S. House and the U.S. Senate each appoint three of their members to 
ACIR. Two of the members from each house are members of the majority 
party, and one member from each house belongs to the minority party. 
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The president appoints four governors and four mayors (two Democrats and 
two Republicans each) as well as three state legislators and three elected county 
officials (two each from the president's party and one each from the opposition 
party). However, the president is obligated by the law to appoint these state and 
local officials only from nominations submitted by the national associations of 
these respective officials. The associations, though, must present the president 
with two or more choices for each seat on ACIR. Governors, therefore, are 
nominated by the National Governors' Association, state legislators by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, county officials by the National 
Association of Counties, and mayors by joint nomination of the National League 
of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Ordinarily, the associations 
nominate their leaders. 
In summary, ACIR's members include three private citizens, three 
executive-branch "civil servants," and 20 elected federal, state, and local 
government officials. The 23 government members of ACIR retain their seats 
on the commission for their two-year terms only as long as they hold their 
primary public office. If a governor, for example, loses a reelection bid in his 
home state in the middle of his two-year term on ACIR, then he also loses his 
seat on ACIR. 
The members of ACIR receive no salary. They are, however, paid travel 
and subsistence expenses for attending commission meetings and other official 
functions. The private-citizen members receive $50 per day for attending 
commission functions. Members who are part-time state or local officials also 
are eligible for the $50 per day honorarium, but none have claimed this payment 
in recent memory. The commission ordinarily holds four plenary meetings a 
year, with various committees of the commission meeting as necessary (and 
usually infrequently). 
83 
Relative to the Committee of the Regions, it might be noted that the 
Commission's membership emphasizes elected government officials representing 
general-purpose governments. The three federal executive officers. serve on 
ACIR out of practical necessity because the executive branch's only elected 
officials--the president and the vice president--cannot be expected to join the 
commission's quarterly meetings and otherwise attend to the details of ACIR's 
work. In addition, neither the private-citizen members nor the elected official 
members of ACIR are permitted to send voting alternates to ACIR meetings. 
The members must be present in person in order to vote on official ACIR 
business. 
The composition of ACIR is intended to facilitate its mission in several 
respects. 
For one, except for the three private-citizen members, membership is limited 
to the nation's three general-purpose units of government: federal, state, and 
local. Consequently, there is no ambiguity about regional, territorial, or other 
areal representation. Within these membership limits, moreover, efforts are 
ordinarily made to ensure that all sections of the country, as well as small 
jurisdictions, are represented on ACIR. 
Townships are not represented on ACIR because they exist in only 20 states 
and because, in some states, they are little more than road-building and 
road-maintenance districts. Similarly, special districts and independent school 
districts are not represented on ACIR because they perform only one or a few 
public functions. Tribal governments are not represented because of their 
different status as "domestic dependent nations" and their direct relationship to 
the federal government. However, all of these forms of government have 
agitated periodically for membership on ACIR. 
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Second, ACIR's membership reflects an effort to bridge three major divides 
in the American system of government: (1} the separation of powers between 
the legislative and executive branches in the federal and state governments; (2) 
the division of powers between the states and the federal government; and (3) 
the cleavage between the nation's two dominant political parties. As such, 
ACIR is consensus-oriented and tends to be most politically effective when it 
produces and promotes consensus recommendations. Dissension on ACIR tends 
to reflect dissension in the larger intergovernmental system. 
Third, disagreements among members of ACIR do not always follow party 
lines. Instead, differences often reflect disagreements between state and local 
officials and federal officials, between legislative and executive officials, 
between small and large jurisdictions, and so on. The members do not feel 
constrained to follow party lines, and the diverse self-interests of each 
member--as member of a party, elected official of a particular government, and 
member of one branch of government--encourages the members to seek 
consensus positions. 
Fourth, ACIR has provided an institutional seat at the intergovernmental 
bargaining table for local governments. The creation of ACIR acknowledged 
the position of local government as "third partner" in the federal system. Given 
ACIR's purely advisory function, this seat may be more symbolic than 
substantive, but its importance to local officials has been reflected in their high 
levels of participation on the commission. Generally, local officials have been 
ACIR's most active members, followed by governors and state legislators from 
small states (e.g., North Dakota). Governors and legislators from large states, 
such as California, New York, and Texas, have rarely been active participants 
in ACIR's functions, in part because those states have large congressional 
delegations and many other channels of political clout in Washington. 
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Fifth, the party composition of ACIR indirectly reflects party control of the 
various governments and branches of government in the federal system. 
Consequently, ACIR is sensitive to the partisan outcomes of elections but not 
radically or quickly altered by those outcomes, as suggested by the following 
party consequences for ACIR of the Republican victories in the 1994 elections: 
ACIR Members 
Democrats Republicans 
1994 1995 1994 ·- 3'.i 
Private Citizens 3 3 0 0 
Federal Executive Branch 3 3 0 0 
U.S. House 2 1 2 
U.S. Senate 2 1 1 2 
Governors 2 2 2 2 
State Legislators 2 2 1 1 
County Officials 2 2 1 1 
Mayors 2 2 2 2 
Totals 18 16 8 10 
If the Republicans capture the White House in 1996 and retain control of the 
Congress, then the number of Republican members of ACIR would increase 
from 10 in 1995 to 18 by 1998 or 1999, depending on how many ACIR 
members President Clinton would appoint for two-year terms during the last 
days of his administration. The maximum number of commission seats that can 
be held by one political party is 18 (69 percent of ACIR's membership). 
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The ACIR Staff 
ACIR has long had a good reputation for hiring competent professional staff. 
The ACIR executive director is hired and fired by a majority vote of the 
commission members. The chairman of ACIR has complete authority to hire 
and fire all other staff members, none of whom are protected by federal 
civil-service rules. Despite opportunities for abuse of this personnel power, the 
chairman ordinarily delegates this power to the executive director. With only 
a few exceptions, this power has been exercised in a professional non-partisan 
manner. 
Historically, ACIR has had two research divisions: (1) Government Finance 
and (2) Government Structure and Policy (actually everything other than fiscal 
matters). For nearly two decades, ACIR also had an Implementation Section 
that sought to publicize and promote the adoption of the commission's policy 
recommendations. The Commission's staff reached a high point of about 38 
full-time persons in the late 1970s, but declined to 22 persons by 1986 and to 
12 full-time persons by late 1994. 
Three observations might be made about ACIR's staff. First, the 
professional non-partisan staff has greatly enhanced the credibility and influence 
of ACIR. The commission's staff and its work have rarely been accused of 
being partisan or otherwise prejudiced toward particular political views. Data 
and other information issued by the staff are as reliable as possible, and staff 
reports on public issues are ordinarily well balanced and reflective of diverse 
viewpoints. In carrying out its research, the staff solicits input from many 
public officials, scholars, and other citizens across the country. Second, a 
competent professional staff has been essential for ACIR' s operation because the 
commission members, who meet infrequently, rely heavily on staff support. 
Quite often, the members and staff of ACIR have functioned as genuine 
partners. Third, the ability to hire and fire its own staff has been important for 
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maintaining the commission's independence. The commission can supplement 
its staff with personnel borrowed for various periods from other federal agencies 
and from state and local governments, but it is not dependent on the personnel 
largess of other agencies. 
The ACIR Budget 
As noted above, the Congress has reduced its funding support for ACIR 
since 1985. To compensate for the reductions, the Congress has insisted since 
1985 that the commission levy charges· for the distribution of its reports and 
seek greater "cost-sharing" support from the 50 states. 
In soliciting voluntary financial contributions from the states, ACIR 
encounters the classic free-rider problem. No more than 35 states have ever 
contributed to ACIR's budget in any given year, and two states--Nevada and 
Texas--have never contributed to ACIR. Soliciting state contributions requires 
constant attention and valuable staff time. In addition, some states try to insist 
on direct ACIR services for their contribution, which is both impossible and 
inappropriate for the commission. Furthermore, state contributions place the 
commission in a "Catch 22" situation. Congressional appropriators argue that 
increased state support for ACIR is necessary to demonstrate the viability 
necessary to sustain congressional support, but as state support increases, the 
Congress feels free to reduce its cost share. 
The 1985 congressional requirement that ACIR sell its reports had a severe 
impact on the commission's visibility and political influence. Prior to 1985, 
ACIR routinely distributed 7,000 to 15,000 or more copies of its reports to 
federal, state, and local officials, libraries, scholars, and others across the 
country and even around the world. The initial charges levied in 1986, though 
modest, reduced dissemination by at least 90 percent. Many prior recipients of 
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ACIR's free reports resented the charges and mistakenly believed that the user 
fees had been demanded by Republican President Ronald Reagan. Report sales 
also required ACIR to advertise and to establish a system for r~ceiving and 
accounting for sales revenue--thus diverting more staff time from the 
commission's principal mission. ACIR continued to distribute, at no charge, its 
quarterly magazine Intergovernmental Perspective to more than 17,000 U.S. 
readers (but no longer foreign readers) but remained prohibited by law from 
soliciting commercial advertising to help support the magazine. 
Another long-standing source of revenue for ACIR has been grants and 
contracts from government agencies and private foundations for research and 
specific services. Such funding was not pursued aggressively by A{:IR before 
1985, but since then, external funding has become more important for the 
commission's viability. The principal danger of grants and contracts is that they 
can become ends in themselves, diverting an agency from its mission. Thus far, 
however, ACIR has been quite successful in limiting the scramble for dollars to 
projects consistent with its mission. 
As a result of these various sources of revenue, ACIR's total 1993 budget 
(including its congressional appropriation) was the largest in the commission's 
history. 
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The Principal Roles of ACIR 
ACIR engages in roughly six types of activities. 
Recommendations 
Most important is the commission's role in making intergovernmental policy 
recommendations to the Congress, the president, and state and local 
governments. ACIR has made more than 300 policy recommendations during 
the past 35 years. Unfortunately, it is impossible to measure the success of this 
role with precision; however, it is reasonable to estimate that more than 50 
percent of the commission's recommendations~ have been adopted over the years. 
In addition, many ACIR information reports containing no recommendations 
have helped to frame policy debates and shape policy decisions.· 
At the same time, there have been some spectacular failures. For example, 
ACIR has long advocated a federal policy of fiscal equalization for the states; 
nevertheless, the United States remains one of the few federal democracies 
having no fiscal equalization program for its constituent governments--even 
though Canada adopted and modified the Representative Tax System measure 
developed by ACIR in the early 1960s for this purpose.*' 
• See "ACIR and the Federal System, 1959-1989," Intergovernmental Perspective 15 (Fall 
1989) "ACIR at 35--Anniversary Issue," Intergovernmental Perspective 20 (Summer/Fall 
1994) .. 
"ACIR, RTS 1991: State Revenue Capacity and Effort (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1993) 
and ACIR, Representative Expenditures: Addressing the Neglected Dimension of Fiscal 
Capacity (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1990). 
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Research 
The recommendations of the commission are based on extensive research 
carried out by the ACIR staff. The commission selects· the intergovernmental 
issues it wishes to address and directs the staff to conduct the necessary 
research. The nature and depth of the research depend on the nature of the issue 
and the availability of previous credible research. The results of the staff 
research are presented to the commission, which then votes to approve or 
disapprove the publication of a policy report containing recommendations or 
simply an information report. 
Occasionally, and at its own discretion, though also peril, ACIR engages in 
research specifically requested by the Congress or the president. It is politically 
difficult for ACIR to reject a congressional or presidential resear~h request, 
although the commission ordinarily insists on supplementary funding to carry 
out requested research of any extensive nature. 
Evaluation 
ACIR also evaluates developments in long-standing policies as well as 
proposed laws and administrative rules likely to have an impact on the federal 
system. In some cases, congressional committees and executive agencies solicit 
ACIR's advice; in other cases, ACIR provides unsolicited and sometimes 
unwelcome advice. As the U.S. economy has become more service-based, 
ACIR has also sought to evaluate the rationales of policies established in earlier 
eras to govern the intergovernmental taxation and regulation of such major 
service industries as banking, insurance, and telecommunications. 
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Monitoring 
The members of the commission and the staff are often the first to identify 
emerging trends and problems in the federal system, such as the problem of 
federal mandates first identified by ACIR in the early 1970s. The Congress 
initially responded in 1981 when it enacted the ACIR-recommended State and 
Local Government Cost Estimate Act. Only in 1995 did the Congress enact 
legislation to provide actual substantive relief for state and local governments 
from unfunded federal mandates. 
Much of ACIR's monitoring activity, however, simply involves the issuance 
of data and other information annually or biennially. For example, ACIR's 
annual publication, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, is a widely used 
and respected data book. Even though much, though not all, of this information 
is available elsewhere, ACIR packages the data in accessible forms relevant to 
measuring fiscal trends in the intergovernmental system. In some cases, ACIR 
provides the only measures for certain trends extending across decades. 
Convening Forum 
ACIR also performs an important function by serving as a reasonably neutral 
forum for convening relevant federal, state, and local officials as well as private 
interest groups to address specific issues. Some high-level forums engage the 
president and leaders of the Congress; most, however, involve less prominent 
officials as well as bureaucrats brought together by ACIR to help resolve 
specific administrative issues (e.g., river-basin management, infrastructure 
investment, environmental permitting, and spatial data sharing). These forums 
are often successful because ACIR is viewed as neutral and seeks to facilitate 
rather than direct problem resolution. 
ACIR also assists federal executive agencies in working with state and local 
officials. Many federal laws and executive orders direct agencies to cooperate 
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with their state and local counterparts; however, federal agencies are often 
unable to initiate cooperation or to respond adequately to overtures from state 
and local officials. Most federal civil servants have no personal experience with 
state or local government and, therefore, no idea of how their actions may affect 
those governments adversely. At times, hostile relations also stand as barriers 
to cooperation. ACIR, therefore, endeavors to help federal bureaucrats reach out 
to their state and local counterparts and bring all the relevant officials together 
in a neutral forum where they temper their hostilities, begin to understand each 
other, and initiate cooperation. 
ACIR does not, however, engage in direct dispute mediation or resolution 
between specific governments or agencies in the federal system. Such disputes 
are addressed and resolved in the Congress, executive agencies, or the courts. 
ACIR also serves informally as secretariat for ACIR-counterpart bodies, 
which have been established inde~endently by 26 states and helps to convene 
an annual meeting of these state ACIRs. 
Public Information 
In addition, ACIR serves as a major source of public information on 
federalism and intergovernmental relations. In some areas, ACIR is the only 
source of certain intergovernmental information. One measure of this function 
is that despite its tiny staff, ACIR responded on average to 1800 telephone 
requests for information per month in 1993, in addition to requests received by 
mail and fax. 
Information made available by ACIR is used widely by policymakers, the 
news media, interest groups, civic organizations, scholars, and teachers. Indeed, 
during the 1960s, ACIR played an important role in stimulating the academic 
study of intergovernmental relations, and ACIR's reports often served as 
93 
classroom texts. Most recently, for example, ACIR pioneered new research on 
the re-emerging importance of state constitutions, one product of which was the 
first 50-state casebook on state constitutional law ever published in American 
history. This casebook has helped to stimulate the establishment of courses on 
state constitutional law at law schools. 
Another aspect of ACIR's information dissemination is the provision of 
short-term technical assistance to federal, state, and local government agencies 
on specific matters. For many years, ACIR also recommended model or 
template legislation for enactment by state and local governments. These model 
laws and ordinances were quite popular, even though state legislatures and city 
councils often modified ACIR's proposals for better or for worse. During the 
1980s, however, ACIR ceded this function to other organizations, such as the 
Council of State Governments and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, that now issue such models on virtually all public policy issues. 
The End of ACIR? 
Unfortunately, this discussion of ACIR may soon have to be read as an 
epitaph. Despite 35 years of what most observers have regarded as exemplary 
service, ACIR may cease to exist in the near future. In addition to 
congressional appropriations reductions, ACIR was zeroed out of the proposed 
federal budget approved by the U.S. House of Representatives in 1993 and 
1994. In each year, an appropriation was restored through Senate action, but the 
fiscal pressures facing the new Republican Congress are likely to destroy ACIR. 
Even though ACIR's $1 million appropriation is an insignificant portion of the 
federal government's $1.4 trillion budget, many Republican and some 
Democratic representatives are determined to cut spending wherever possible. 
As some members of the Congress have said, "ACIR certainly does good work; 
nevertheless, we must now defund government agencies that are nice to have in 
order to fund agencies that we must have." Politically, ACIR is an easy target, 
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and abolishing a government agency, even a tiny agency with 12 employees, has 
considerable symbolic appeal to voters. 
The decline and possible demise of ACIR can be attributed to a number of 
factors mostly external to the commission. 
For one, an advisory body is, by definition, non-essential and can survive 
only so long as the subject matter of its advice is regarded as necessary and 
important by the recipients of the advice. After 35 years, the political actors 
who saw a need for ACIR in 1959 have passed from the scene, to be replaced 
by new actors having different interests. In particular, in the early 1980s, 
members of the Congress who had been strong champions of ACIR since 1959 
retired from the House and the Senate. 
ACIR had been rendered less essential by the mid-1980s, in part, because 
the national associations of state and local governments had considerably 
improved their institutional lobbying presence in Washington from 1959 to the 
1980s. These associations now provide information and consultations once 
available only from ACIR. Furthermore, they present information in ways that 
best serve their interests. Because of ACIR's intergovernmental and bipartisan 
composition, the commission is not always a reliable ally of any one 
governmental interest--federal, state, or local--in the federal system. Hence, 
some or all of the state and local associations have become quick to criticize 
ACIR when its policy recommendations do not suit their interests. There is also 
competition between these associations. In particular, the National Governors' 
Association (NGA) regards itself as the premier state-local institution in 
Washington. NGA's view of intergovernmental relations is similar to the 
Canadian concept of "executive federalism." Because of the separation of 
powers in the American system, however, executive federalism is not legally 
viable in the United States. Nevertheless, NGA fights for a premier position and 
frequently opposes the policy positions of other state and local associations as 
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well a& the policy recommendations of ACIR that do not suit NGA's interests. 
In particular, NGA does not support efforts by local governments to be the 
"third partner" in the federal system and to have direct relations with the federal 
government. For example, NGA has generally opposed direct federal aid to 
local governments, arguing that federal funds should be given to the states, 
which should then decide how to pass funds on to local governments. One 
result of NGA's efforts is that 89 percent of federal aid now goes to state 
governments. 
In addition, there has been a proliferation of non-governmental interest 
groups and think tanks in Washington, DC, since 1959, thus vastly increasing 
the flow of information through the political process. These groups use ACIR's 
information when it suits their interests and oppose ACIR recommendations that 
cut against their interests. Furthermore, the information overload produced by 
interest-group activism often relegates ACIR's work to the status of "more of 
the same." This is all the more true now that federal officials tend to regard 
state and local governments as little more than "special interests" hardly 
distinguishable from other "special interests" operating in the system. As a 
result, some members of the Congress have come to regard ACIR as little more 
than an inside lobbyist for state and local interests, even though, officially, 
ACIR is not permitted to lobby on behalf of its policy recommendations. 
Interest-group proliferation in Washington, DC, has had profound 
consequences not only for ACIR but also for the federal system. In essence, 
interest groups have shifted federal policymaking from the interests of places 
(i.e., state and local governments) to persons (i.e., constituents directly). For 
example, in 1978, only 32 percent of federal aid to state and local governments 
was dedicated for payments to individuals (i.e., welfare and Medicaid). Today, 
approximately 63 percent of federal aid to state and local governments is 
dedicated for payments to individuals. In essence, state governments especially 
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operate increasingly as administrative arms of federal welfare policy, passing 
federal money through to their citizens under federal rules: 
Non-governmental interest groups have also been strong advocates of 
unfunded federal mandates on state and local governments. Given the 
reluctance and often unwillingness of the Congress to raise taxes, advocates for 
the interests of the poor, persons with disabilities, environmental protection, and 
the like have successfully lobbied for stronger federal policies that must be 
implemented by state and local governments with their own revenues, thus 
forcing state and local officials to raise taxes or reduce other services. Hence, 
members of the Congress can enjoy the pleasure of enacting popular policies 
without experiencing the pain of asking citizens to pay for those policies. 
Policymaking for persons rather than places has become highly advantageous 
to members of the Congress because, with "one person, one vote" 
reapportionment of the U.S. House since the 1960s, the rise of the national 
media, and the decline of state and local party organizations, the reelection of 
members of the Congress depends primarily on their ability to appeal directly 
to voters and serve constituents directly and often personally. In addition, while 
the non-governmental interest groups serve as major sources of campaign 
financing for congressional candidates, the associations of state and local 
officials can do very little to help a member of the Congress win reelection. 
Hence, as one U.S. Senate member of ACIR commented recently, "There is no 
longer any political capital in intergovernmental relations, nor is there any 
political advantage for me to serve on ACIR." 
Another major change in the federal system has been a significant increase 
in federal preemption (i.e., displacement) of state and local authority since the 
• John Kincaid, "Constitutional Federalism: Labor's Role in Displacing Places to Benefit 
Persons," PS: Political Science & Politics 26 (June 1993): 172-177. 
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1969. A recent ACIR study discovered that 53 percent of all explicit 
preemption statutes enacted by the Congress in 205 years of U.S. history have 
been enacted only since 1969 (the last 26 years of U.S. history). Ironically, 
preemption has been stimulated in part by what has been called "the resurgence 
of the states," namely, increased state professionalism, activism, and regulation. 
This resurgence has driven many business interests to Washington, DC, to seek 
federal preemption of state regulation by uniform federal regulation. Concerns 
about economic competition from the European Union, Japan, and elsewhere 
have also stimulated federal preemption of "fragmented systems of state and 
local regulation" in order to establish more uniform narional rules for a more 
common internal market. Although ordinarily protective of their prerogatives, 
economic concerns have driven even many state and local officials, especially 
governors and mayors, to support federal preemption of state and local powers. 
Consequently. despite his New Federalism philosophy of restoring more powers 
to the states, President Ronald Reagan signed more preemption laws than any 
other president in U.S. history.* 
The rise of preemption, unfunded mandates, and federal policymaking for 
persons placed ACIR in a difficult political position by the 1980s. ACIR had 
flourished during the era of "cooperative federalism" when federal aid to state 
and local governments increased significantly. Federal aid, however, peaked in 
1978 and declined thereafter, while also shifting from places to persons. 
Cooperation deteriorated in the more constrained fiscal climate of the 1980s, and 
with the rise of mandates and preemptions, intergovernmental relations entered 
a contentious era of "coercive federalism.,.. Given that ACIR had been 
'John Kinc~d, "Economic U~ion and Federal Diversity: Should a Coca-Cola Bottle Carry 
51 Health Warn_mgs and, If So, m What Language?" Economic Union in Federal Systems, 
~~~68~ne Mullms and Cheryl Saunders (Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press, 1994), pp. 
•• John. Kincaid, "From Cooperation to Coercion in American Federalism: Housing, 
Fragmentation, and Preemption, 1780-1992," Journal of Law and Politics 9 (Winter 1993)· 
333-433. . 
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founded primarily on the premise of cooperation, the commission found it 
increasingly difficult to champion cooperation under such conditions. In 
addition, because the primary source of coercive federalism's mandates and 
preemptions has been the Congress, ACIR's policy recommendations necessarily 
became increasingly critical of the Congress--ACIR's primary source of funding. 
During the era of cooperative federalism and rising federal aid, ACIR could 
work smoothly with the Congress, but in this new era, ACIR's relations with the 
Congress became increasingly conflictual. 
This conflict was exacerbated during the 1980s by the highly partisan 
climate created by divided government, namely, Republican control of the White 
House from 1981 through 1992, Democratic control of the U.S. House for the 
entire period, and Democratic control of the U.S. Senate from 1987 through 
1992. Given that the president appoints 20 of ACIR's 26 members, Democrats 
in the Congress tended to dismiss ACIR as a puppet of Republican presidents. 
At the same time, given the rules of bipartisan composition of ACIR, which 
gave Democrats a significant voice in ACIR, Presidents Reagan and Bush could 
not regard ACIR as a reliable ally. Consequently, in this highly charged 
partisan environment, ACIR--as an independent, objective, bipartisan 
institution--became increasingly irrelevant to the immediate political interests of 
the Congress and the White House and, therefore, of many state and local 
officials as well, who now had the ability to lobby more directly and forcefully 
for their own interests. As the chief staff lobbyist for the National Governors' 
Association put it recently, "I have always supported ACIR and believed that it 
does good work, but it has simply become academic." 
Despite its contributions over the years, therefore, the future of ACIR is in 
doubt. Although many of the functions performed by ACIR remain valued by 
federal, state, and local officials and others, the commission can no longer 
function as a major player in the central political issues of contemporary 
American intergovernmental relations. 
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The experience of ACIR poses several potential issues for the Committee of 
the Regions. For one, the Committee's work is likely to be shaped by the 
inherent tension between regional and local self-government and the free-trade 
and mobility requirements of economic union. Subsidiarity could leave regional 
and local governments to forage for little more than leftover powers at the 
bottom of a multi-level food chain. Second, strong regions having significant 
subnational powers are likely to support the Committee so long as it advances 
their objectives, but to circumvent the Committee when it suits their interests. 
Third, regional interests will have to contend not only with national government 
interests but also with non-governmental interests proliferating throughout the 
EU. Fourth, democratization of the EU will profoundly affect regional interests, 
producing cross-pressures that could render the Committee irrelevant over time. 
Fifth, the Committee will have to make strategic agenda choices, especially 
between strategies of political advocacy and of intergovernmental management 
and consultation. 
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The Experience of the 
Economic and Social Committee of the European Community 
Roger Morgan• 
These remarks are based on a report on the Economic and Social committee, 
which I wrote some years ago. The position of the Economic and Social 
Committee, among the institutions of the Community, is often rather like the 
position of the Committee of the Regions in the list of French institutions that 
Mr. Vallve described earlier: it is absent. The Economic and Social Committee 
is not always regarded as a prominent feature of the institutional structure of the 
Community: I was very glad in fact that it was mentioned on· the French 
description that we heard about earlier. It is of course an advisory committee, 
and the question with this as with other advisory bodies is, why should anybody 
take any notice of its advice? Why should it have any influence? I suppose there 
are two answers in the principles which led to the establishment of the 
Economic and Social Committee. One is, it is a source of expertise which would 
otherwise not be available; secondly, it is in a sense representative. Now 
questions have to be asked both about how expert the Economic and Social 
Committee has been, and about the sense in which it can be regarded as a 
representative body. I'll remind you that it is a relatively small body. Until the 
recent enlargement of the Community it had 189 members. There were 24 each 
from the bigger member States, and smaller numbers, down to the number of 
6, from Luxembourg. As for its representativity, it is divided into three groups; 
it represents three major categories of European society, or European economic 
life. Groups 1 and 2 of the three represent the so-called "social partners", the 
employers and their employees, the trade union organizations. Group 3 is other 
sectors of society, professions liberales, experts of various kinds, economists, 
and so on. You can see right away that 'Y:ith a very small body such as this the 
• Department of Political Science, European University Institute, Florence. 
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chances of the expertise being comprehensive are not very high, because there 
are large elements in society that cannot really be represented in this body, and 
t~ere are obviously areas of expertise that cannot be represented. The members 
are appointed by the respective governments. They are members a titre 
personnel. Here we have a problem that was touched on just now, that is, a 
member of the Economic and Social Committee, even if he or she is for 
instance there because he holds a high position in an employer's organization or 
a trade union organization, is there in his personal capacity and cannot be 
represented by a suppliant or a replacement at full meetings of the committee. 
That has been a problem certainly, among those I will come to later. To take 
away already one confusion: very senior officials, those with the top 
responsibility ill major organizations of industrial society are generally not going 
to commit themselves to spend the amount of time that is required, as members 
of the Economic and Social Committee. So you can say, there are some experts, 
there are some members of the Committee who are representative and there are 
some who might be said to be both. The function of the Committee of course 
is to give an opinion, to exercise an advisory role in the preparation of European 
Community legislation. Its basic raison d' etre I suppose could be summarized 
by saying that it brings the lobbying process out into the open: the process of 
interaction and conflict between economic interests is brought into an open 
forum, where there is a confrontation of different points of view. It may produce 
a consensus on many matters, for instance, on what became the Social Chapter 
of the Maastrich Treaty, the confrontation of different interests in the Economic 
and Social Committee certainly played a part in bringing agreement about. 
Where there is not a consensus, then the bringing to light of conflicting interests 
is, I think we would agree, better than allowing the influence of important 
economic interests to be exercised in private, behind the scenes. 
What are the other advantages or ways in which a body like this advisory 
committee can make a contribution to good legislation for Europe? At its best, 
it can assess what the new issues are, because of its expertise it can see the 
issues arising from new technology, from migration, from other significant 
trends in European society, and it can help to identify the importance of these 
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and draw them to the attention of those with influence and power in the 
Community. In the preparation of a complex programme like the single-market 
programme, the Economic and Social Committee certainly could argue that it 
had among its members expertise that was useful in preparing the legislation. If 
you are looking for other justifications for a body of this kind, it can help 
through its expertise in making the European economy competitive in the world 
market, which everyone would agree is important. Again, at its best, this 
committee can play a role in the integration of societies, which is a much more 
difficult operation than the integration of economies. If we are talking about 
social cohesion in the broader sense, or the establishment of a common sense 
of a European society, then a body that represents the various sectors of civil 
society in Europe certainly has a role to play. Again, the old problem of 
implementation, the problem of supervising and evaluatirig how well 
programmes are put into operation, is one where it would seem that the 
Economic and Social Committee can play a part. As part of its operation, I 
mentioned that it had the function of giving advice on legislation before it is 
prepared and enacted. It also has the function of making reports on certain areas 
of policy: energy policy, the implementation of regional policy and the 
macroeconomic situation of the EC have been areas in which the Economic and 
Social Committee has had the function of evaluating the implementation of 
Community policies. That is a very brief statement of the arguments in favor of 
a committee of this kind, and to some extent I think the Economic and Social 
Committee can say that it has lived up to what was expected under these 
headings. 
There are however a number of disadvantages or weaknesses of the 
Economic and Social Committee, and it may be that these are points on which 
the Committee of the Regions may be able to draw some lessons. Some are 
obviously much more relevant than others. One weakness, it seems to me, of the 
Economic and Social Committee now, in the 1990s, is that its basically 
corporatist or collective way of organizing social interests or representing them, 
is not fully in tune with the spirit of the times. Maybe the times are changing, 
maybe the Zeitgeist is changing again, but certainly in the period, let's say in the 
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1980s, when deregularization and liberalization and so on were the great 
watchwords, then a body that represented organized corporate interests at the 
European level, as at the level of some of the member states, was not. regarded 
as corresponding fully to the spirit of the times, anywar by certain governments. 
A second weakness of that committee (this really doesn't apply to the 
Committee of the Regions) is that it could be accused of trying to harmonize 
legislation at the European level, trying to create a common European pattern, 
aiding in the general purpose of the Community in trying to harmonize 
legislation and regulations at the European level, and not respecting enough the 
principle of subsidiarity. Now that is obviously not an accusation or a weakness 
that could be regarded as attaching to the Committee of the Regions. Of course 
by definition, if there is a body that stands for subsidiarity in the institutional 
set-up, I suppose it will be the Committee of the Regions. A rather different sort 
of weakness that has been apparent for the Economic and Social Committee is 
that it has not really found an influential place in relation to the other 
institutions of the Communitf It has not on the whole been welcomed by the 
European Parliament (EP), although it might have been accepted that the 
expertise of the Committee could be useful to the EP. This has certainly been 
true in one or two specific areas, quite technical ones, like the harmonization of 
value-added tax. On this, for instance, I recall that the preparatory work of the 
Economic and Social Committee was appreciated and used by the Rapporteur 
of the relevant committee in the European Parliament. But these are exceptions, 
it has not yet been normally the case that the work done on policy issues by the 
Economic and Social Committee has been appreciated by the members of the 
European Parliament or by the Parliament as a whole. Sometimes its relations 
with the Council of Ministers have been bad. Certain people in the Secretariat 
of the Council of :tvfutisters would argue that the opinions of the Economic and 
Social Committee are not very important and therefore there is no particular 
reason to spread them very actively among members of Council working parties. 
Representatives of the Economic and Social Committee would argue that 
certainly the Council Secretariat sometimes fails in its duty of making sure that 
the opinions of the Economic and Social Committee are brought to the attention 
104 
of members of Council working parties. One important point perhaps is that the 
Economic and Social Committee has not succeeded in synchronizing its 
timetable of work very effectively with the Council working parties. The 
timetables of the Community institutions are obviously extremely complex and 
very heavy. I believe it is true to say that the Economic and Social Committee 
has succeeded in coordinating its work quite effectively with the work of the 
Commission, but when it comes to Council working parties, there have often 
been cases when ihe Council is not represented at the Economic and Social 
Committee section meeting (that's the group of the Economic and Social 
Committee that deals with a particular problem) by anyone who had any 
knowledge of the problem. And there have been problems with the timetable for 
the work of the organs, especially the Council, not being well coordinated. Now 
why is that? The Council has not taken the Economic and Social Committee 
very seriously. I don't know what the answer is as to how the Regional 
Committee will be able to get itself taken more seriously, but I point to 
something that has been a problem. 
More serious maybe is that the Economic and Social Committee has not 
always been taken very seriously even by the organized interests that it is there 
to represent. The major trade union federations, the major employers' 
organizations who should be represented and are represented in Groups 1 and 
2 of the Economic and Social Committee, often have their own direct channels 
of communication to the Commission, or to the national governments, and have 
not regarded this Committee as being a relevant or useful channel for them. That 
is linked with the fact that the very top office-holders of these bodies will not 
or cannot find the time to be members of the Economic and Social Committee. 
A further weakness is that, I think it's fair to say, the Economic and Social 
Committee has tried to spread its efforts too widely. It has tried to give attention 
to every question of Community policy, and to comment on every proposal for 
regulation; on some of them, what it can manage to say is interesting but on 
some others it is less interesting. So I have an impression that the value of 
Ecosoc opinions in general has been rather devalued, because some of them are 
just routine statements. That is, I repeat, because the Committee has made an 
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attempt to find something to say on every question that was submitt d . 
e to It There may be a lesson there, that the Committee of the Regions should · 
be 1 . A furth . try to more se ectJve. er possible weakness in Ecosoc is the quest' 
. . . Ion of 
whether It really Is representative. Groups 1 and 2 represent in a sen 
' se, the 
major organized bodies, the social partners of industrial society. But Group 
3 
which we must remember, is only one-third of the total membership of th~ 
Committee, doesn't fully represent all of the sectors of modern society 
or of 
modern economic life. Information, technology, science, research, are not 
adequately represented, whereas agriculture for instance is massively 
represented, partly through the presence of agricultural employers in Group 1 as 
well as farmer~ :-o. Group 3. So there is a question: I don't think this problem 
arises in the regional representation, because here we are talking about a 
committee representing territorial entities, but in this functional body that I am 
talking about, certainly some major sectors of modem society are not 
represented. A further aspect of Jack of representation is that the representation 
of the big member-states is not big enough. It is disproportionate, in that the 
large member-states still have only 24 members each. This makes it quite hard 
to say that all of the aspects of society in those countries are represented. 
I have mentioned the problem about the absence of the top leaders. Maybe 
the answer to that, which has been discussed for Ecosoc, isthat the working 
members of the Economic and Social Committee would not normally be the top 
office-holders in the various organizations, but there might every year be one 
special session at which the big bosses of the big labour unions, the big heads 
of the employers' organizations, would be present so as to be associated with the 
work of the Committee. I don't know how relevant that idea might be to the 
Regional Committee. Again. Ecosoc's links with the national counterparts of the 
Economic and Social Committee are not as good as they should be. Almost, 
every member state of the Union has some kind of an Economic and Social 
Committee (the British one, "Neddy", the National Economic Development 
Organization, was abolished a few years ago). But even though most of the 
states have something of this kind representing the major sectors of society, 
Ecosoc has not always managed to maintain successful links with them, nor 
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. deed with regional authorities in the member-states, nor with the economic ~terest groups that operate at the European level. In a Europe in which 
:onomic interests are now increasingly represented by federations at the 
European Community level, Ecosoc is slightly old-fashion~d ~ the sense that 
it contains representatives of the national economic and social mterests, but has 
inadequate links and no direct representation of the interest groups at the 
Community leveL 
There may be some good news in the end, though I am giving you mainly 
stories about weakness and problems. I'm afraid another problem is t~at ~he 
Economic and Social Committee hasnot been very effective at commurucatmg 
to the outside world just what is special about the advice that it can offer. In 
some cases- an opinion from the Economic and Social Committee really d~s 
bring together the points of view of different and conflicting interests: as'~ s~d, 
the Social Chapter developed from debates about the idea of a European social 
space", conducted in the Economic and Social Committee. There are ideas .w~ch 
one can see have had an effect on the structure and policies of the CommiSSIOn: 
fo~ instance, studies done in the Economic and Social Committee of ~e 
cooperative productive sector, the so-called economie sociale, or . social 
economy, Jed to the creation of DG 23 in the Commission to de~elop ~olicy for 
this economic sector. There are other, perhaps more specific, things, like codes 
for nuclear safety, where the Economic and Social Committee can say it 
contributed something. In helping the Community programs for vocational 
training in Eastern Europe -- quite a large area -- again the advice of this 
Committee was relevant. There is still a tendency in the Commission, however, 
for officials to say "well, we know what these different interests are, if we want 
to talk to the unions we talk to them, if we want to talk to employers we talk 
to them, and what can the Economic and Social Committee provide that is more 
than just the total of the different partial points of view that we can get 
anyway". 1 think that there is an answer to that, and that in some cases what 
comes out of the Economic and Social Committee is more than just the sum of 
the parts, but that the Committee is not very effective at convincing the outside 
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'I 
world that that is the case. It could do more for its publi · c Inlage, and I th;_, 
here there may be lessons for the Committee of ti-le-R · Th ~"1!1C egiOns. e Economi 
Social Committee could do more work as well, despite all the com . . c and 
oth think tank hi petition from 
er s, w ch makes Brussels very like Washington: the Coi11Jnit 
could undertake studies of problems that are not yet ripe for polif al d . . tee 
bl f . . IC eCISion 
pro ems o an agmg population, problems of what happens with · . -
f t f fu ffilgration 
es Ima es o ture demand for different sorts of skill d 1 b ' 
. . . e a our, and so forth 
Think-tank, forecasting work IS something the Economic and Social C . · 
has d b. f omnu.ttee 
one a It o , but perhaps could do more. Again there is 1 . . , eva uat10n· 1 
mentiOned that when the Commission makes a report · 
. . every year of 
1n1plementahon of the legislation for the single market or impleme t t. 
. ' n a Ion of the 
regiOnal development program, there is an evaluation of that report b 
E · dS" Ythe 
conorruc an ocml Committee, but again I think that Committee b ld d pro ably 
cou o more. It could do more on active lobbying: the Committee · 
. . . . sometimes 
acts as If It thinks all It has to do is to produce a formal report for the Cou .l 
a d th . . b . nCI , 
n en Its JO Is done. But in practice (and this may be a lesson £o th 
C . f r e 
Ommittee o the Regions), if influential members of the Economic and S .al 
c . ~ o~ttee .can talk to ministers in their own countries, or talk to 
parliame.ntarians, and put in a bit of personal lobbying, thi.s is something the 
Eco~orruc and Social Committee could do, and maybe the Committee of the 
Regions could do more actively. That is often more useful than some formal 
report t~ough the formal channels. I suppose that if I had to say whether the 
Econorru~ ~d Social Committee ismore valuable because it has expertise or 
because It IS representative, I think I would have to say, it is more valuable 
b~cause of its expertise. It has been able to mobilize expertise for quite obscure 
things such as veterinary regulations etc I don't think the Ec . d S . 
. , · onorruc an oc1al 
Co~ttee can be regarded as a body that is influential through having political 
legi~Imacy, and that, I think, makes it different from the Committee of the 
Regwns. But my suggestion would be that there are a number of ways in which 
an assembly of elected regional political leaders who thus have de t. 1 · ti mocra 1c 
eg~ m~cy, may draw some lessons from the contributions made by a body 
which IS essentially a body of experts from different sections of society. 
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Participation and Representation: 
The Experience of Second Chambers and the Committee of the 
Regions 
Roland Sturm' 
Introduction 
This paper will set the discussion about the Committee of the Regions into the 
context of a wider institutional debate. Increasingly there is reference to a -
however organisationally diverse - "third level" of policy-making in Western 
Europe, adding a regional to the national and European levels. German scholars, 
in particular, with the domestic framework of federalism in mind, often appear 
to search for a European analogy (see for example Bullmann 1994). Regarding 
the Committee of the Regions, however, the problem with this approach is 
twofold. Either it simply assumes an automatism that will lead from a third level 
of policy-making to a "chamber" of the regions (Kalbfleisch-Kottsieper 1994), 
or else there is a preoccupation with muddling-through tactics that are expected, 
in the near future, to increase the power of the Committee of the Regions 
(Hrbek/Weyand 1994: 157f.). 
More systematic constitutional arguments of alternative role models for the 
Committee of the Regions are thus frequently ignored. Yet, before attempting 
to widen the perspective by bringing in the experience of Second Chamber 
arrangements (see Mastias/Grange 1987; Schiittemeyer/S~urm 1992), one point 
needs to be stressed. The broader aims of achieving constitutional coherence of 
the EU, or, as some would argue, of eliminating the "democratic deficit", may 
serve as a useful incentive for a redefinition of the role of the Committee of the 
Regions. But more limited institutional reform will probably not have the 
Committee of the Regions as its prime objective. Though the focus here is on 
• Department of Political Science and European Centre for Research on Federalism, 
Tiibingen University 
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the Committee, this is not meant to suggest reforms in this area will t · ngger a 
more gene~al institutional reform of the EU. In the following, I have divided my 
argument mto two parts, namely aspects of participation and aspects of 
representation. 
I. Participation 
Participation in the European decision-making process can take different forms. 
For a new institution, such as the Committee of Regions, the initial aim must 
be to move beyond a symbolic participation - already achieved by the very fact 
of its creation - and to become a source of influence in its own right. Although 
one could in principle argue that the greater the democratic legitimacy of an 
institution the greater will be its political influence, the experience of the 
directly elected European Parliament shows that this logic is inapplicable in the 
EU. The same is true for Second Chambers where elected ones are not 
necessarily superior with regard to their political influence to non-elected 
Chambers (The House of Lords has a stronger role in the political process than 
the Irish Seanad.). In other words, it is possible to debate the issue of 
participation separately from the issue of representation. 
1.1. Advice 
The Committee of the Regions was given an advisory role by the Maastricht 
treaty, a fact which leads to the more general question about the circumstances 
under which advice can yield influence. Second Chambers have at least the 
institutional role of providing second opinions in the policy process. The 
"mythology" of Second Chambers even has it that they are the necessary 
m~derating part in political life, the "sanior pars". It can be fairly clearly 
pomted out under which pre-conditions their advice is heard. There is a demand 
for their advice when the resources of either time or knowledge are in short 
supply. For the British House of Lords, for example, the point is often made that 
its task is to improve on bills which, because of time constraints come to it from 
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the Commons in a very impedect form. The German Bundesrat introduces in the 
legislative process the administrative know-how of the states (Lander). They are, 
in this respect, in a superior position vis-a-vis the federal government, because 
in the German political system public administration is, by and large, the task 
of the states. 
Advice is more likely to be successful when it is given on issues which are 
politically uncontroversial. If there is, however, a difference of opinion between 
the two Houses of a Parliament and the role of the Second Chamber is legally 
not guaranteed, its advice will simply be ignored. 
For the future role of the Committee of the Regions this means on the one 
hand that the growing complexity and size of the EU which is accompanied by 
an exploding workload provides a window of opportunity for an institution 
which at least in theory can offer time and specialized knowledge. Of course, 
the fulfilment of this institutional promise will only be possible if the advisory 
role of the Committee defined in Art. 198c is given a clear sense of direction. 
It will certainly overburden the Committee and take away any advantage of time 
it may possess, if it reacts to all initiatives of the Council or the Commission. 
The necessary selectivity which is the precondition for sound work should be 
guided by the special type of knowledge assembled in a regional assembly. At 
least in a technical sense of improving the work of EU institutions the 
Committee could in this way establish itself as an indispensable source of 
information and help. 
1.2. Decision-making 
However, the advisory role is not a core element of the decision-making process. 
The critical variable here for Second Chambers is their relationship to other 
Chambers. But even if we have a clear-cut situation of dominance in which the 
First Chamber can force the Second Chamber to accept its decisions, it is 
possible to establish procedures which give Second Chambers a voice, such as 
the "navette" in France or the "VermittlungsausschuB" in Germany in the case 
of bills which do not need the consent of the Bundesrat. Where, as in Italy, 
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Switzerland, Germany (for bills for which the Bundesrat has a vet ) 
U"dS o,orth 
mte tates, the Second Chamber is needed as partner · th e d . . . . m e process of 
ecision-making, It even has an efficient veto. 
Three options are available to the Committee of the R . . h 
. . egwns m t e Europe 
declSlon-making process: an 
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a) the status quo. This means that the Committee remain "th 
. . s WI out any 
powers of decision-making. It does not succeed in linkin . . . . 
. g up mstitutiOnall 
With key actors, such as the Council, the Commission or th E y 
Parliament. ' e uropean 
b) A first step for an improved role of the Committee in decision-makin 
could .be a formalized procedure which asks for the consent of thg 
Co tt · th · · · e 
mmt ee m e decision-making process. Even if, for example, the Council 
may be ~ble to override the Committee's opinion, this role would strengthen 
the pubhc profile of the Committee. One possibility for such a more formal 
rol~ woul~ be, of course, to change the current status of the Committee and 
t~ ~stall It as the Second Chamber of the European Parliament with a role 
Sirrular to the Irish Seanad, the French Senat, the Spanish Senado or the 
H~~se of Lord.s. This means above all the power to delay decisions and the 
abihty to rewnte the wording of decisions. 
c) A veto p~we~ of the Committee of the Regions is at the moment merely 
of syst~~~t~c mterest. As its precondition a complete change in the 
responstbilitJes of ~uropean institutions would have to have taken lace. In 
the relevant scenano Eur ld b . P ope wou e uruted, the nation-states would be a 
phenomenon of the past d th n1 .. 
' an e o Y political counterpart to the E 
" tat " 1 1 uropean s ~ eve would be the regional level. Only this scenario would make it 
possible to argue successfully for a Committee with general veto powers A 
more plausible aim may be a veto for the Committ . . : d . . ee m cases m which 
eclSlons have a clearly defined regional dimension. 
!.3. Control 
Three forms of control of the political process are usually debated: ex ante, 
implementation, and ex post controls. Ex ante control through Second Chambers 
is defined by their involvement in policy advice and decision-making. Second 
Chambers usually have, with the exception of the US Senate, which has access 
to the Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
fairly little control over the policy implementation process and the policy 
evaluation process. 
Yet the current debate on more efficient government, be it the ''Reinventing 
Government" literature (Gaebler/Osbome 1992 and others), or the British Next 
Steps-Initiative (Sturm 1994) stresses the need for paying greater attention to the 
control of outcomes of policies than to input factors. Gaebler and Osborne also 
stress the importance of responsiveness to the needs of regional communities 
and of local control for the success of public policies. 
The Committee of the Regions is in a privileged position to contribute to 
this efficiency debate. It could be the eyes and ears of the European Union in 
the regions. It could monitor the regional dimension of policies, and especially 
of regional politics embodied in the structural and cohesion funds. It could play 
a pioneer role in initiating and supporting cross-border regional cooperation and 
in finding efficient ways of shaping regional infrastructure. 
!.4. Recruitment of Political Personnel 
Second Chambers are often a kind of last chance for politicians at the end of 
their careers. While the Canadian Senate has been particularly singled out for 
critique in this respect, this is a fairly common criticism of Second Chambers 
with appointed members. There is indeed little incentive for active politicians 
to seek membership in those Second Chambers which have only a limited role 
to play in politics. Though this is rarely the case (for example in the House of 
Lords or the Irish Seanad) occasionally even members of Second Chambers in 
a fairly weak constitutional position become members of government. For 
members of those Second Chambers with a constitutionally strong role, such as 
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the Bundesrat or the US-Senate, membership in a Second Chamber is a logical 
(first) step in a successful political career. This kind of career orientation raises 
public attention for the Second Chamber, although this is not nj!cessarily 
advantageous for its institutional profile. Career-oriented members use the 
environment of the Second Chamber as their forum. They may hesitate 
however, when it comes to more general support for the institution "Second 
Chamber" as such. 
So far the membership of the Committee of the Regions seems to offer oni 
r · d Y 
urute career opportunities. This may be different for the Committee's 
President. Two kinds of careers as a result of a successful Committee 
membership are - in theory - possible: on the national and on the European 
level. The value of the latter avenue depends very much on a stronger profile 
of the Committee. If the Committee is successful in carving out its political 
territory within the European Union's institutional structure and in acting as a 
respected voice of the regions, it may attract ambitious politicians. If, however, 
the effect of the Committee's existence is reduced to giving politicians a chance 
to increase their influence in national contexts, then this involves the danger that 
the parochialism of national or regional priorities wiJI become so dominant in 
the work of the Committee that no incentive for a general support of regions of 
a broader regional dimension of European politics will remain. Such decisions, 
made when the national perspective has priority, are necessarily without clear 
direction and are bound to do little to improve the Committee's institutional 
standing. 
II. Representation 
The models of representation which we find in Second Chambers differ widely. 
They range from traditional representation of the nobility in Britain, to the 
representation of social groups as in Ireland, or to the representation of regional 
and local government, as in Spain or France, or of states, as in Germany, or 
even directly of the people, as in Australia or in the United States. Though at 
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present the Maastricht Treaty clearly defines membership in the Committee of 
the Regions by two categories, nationality and territorial government, it is 
important to note the broader implications of the problems of representation and 
interest intermediation. Before these are discussed in more detail, a brief note 
on the problem of territorial representation at a time in which the principle of 
individual equality has become the general norm is necessary. 
Territorial representation postulates the supremacy of equal treatment of 
"places" over the equal treatment of ''persons" (Kincaid 1994). This principle 
may become coercive in cases in which the rights of regions in Europe are in 
conflict with the rights of individual citizens in Europe (an example could be the 
regional choice of a uniform language in public education, a telling example is 
Quebec in Canada). Institutionally the representation of people and the 
representation of places may become a source of conflict between the European 
Parliament and the Committee of the Regions. 
ll.l. Symbolic Representation 
In cases of Second Chambers, such as the Senates in Italy, Spain and France, 
where we find - similar to the Committee of the Regions - a mixture of 
territorial entities of different size and competences, the outcome of the 
decision-making process is very often determined by non-territorial factors, 
above all party. The territorial dimension then becomes de facto symbolic. Yet, 
the social dynamics of a society may come back to the imagery of political 
. symbols, transforming it into a reality of political demands. Spain, which is on 
its way to a kind of de facto asymmetrical federalism, is the best example here. 
(for the debate see Agranoff 1995). 
At the moment having a Committee of the Regions is mainly of symbolic 
importance. For some EU Member States, Germany in particular, it has also 
been an important matter of national politics to possess institutionalized 
representation for their regions on the European level. Here the hopes and 
expectations that de facto symbolic representation will be transformed into 
efficient participation are very strong. 
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In general it can be said that one should not underestimate the power of 
symbols to change perceptions. Now that a Committee of the Regions exists, it 
is probable that it will become the source of demands for a stronger 
representation of regional interests on the European level as well as an 
influential factor in the national debate of those Member States with weak: 
regional structures. Especially in the British case it can be shown that the 
example of other European regions has provoked demands for regional 
organisation and regional representation. (Keating/Loughlin 1995). The 
symbolism of a Committee of the Regions may thus add legitimacy to regional 
demands in those unitary states which have so far paid them little attention. 
I/.3. Territorial Representation 
Many Second Chambers refer to territorial divisions as the principle guiding the 
selection of their membership. This is even the case for the appointed 
membership of the Canadian Senate. The decisive factor for territorial 
representation is, however, whether or not the membership of the Second 
Chamber is elected by units which themselves represent territories. Membership 
becomes a case of indirect territorial representation when individual citizens do 
not elect representatives to the Second Chamber directly. Such indirect 
representation is in many ways problematic when it comes to interest 
representation. The German case is of special interest here, because of the strong 
role the Bundesrat plays in the national decision-making process. The most 
obvious problems (see Schultze 1993) which occur in this context have 
provoked a broad debate. They can be summarized by two observations: 
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1) There seems to be a rather weak: link between regional interests and the 
consequences of regional interest articulation in regional parliaments. 
Regional parliaments seldom successfully transmit regional interests to the 
level of the Second Chamber. 
2) Due to the need to compromise, regional interests articulated by regional 
governments in the Second Chamber never reach the decisions finally made 
in their original form. This leads to a decoupling of the decision-making 
process from interest articulation, combined with a lack of transparency 
created by the behind-the-door negotiations of the representatives of regions. 
Because of the parliamentary majority of regional governments regional 
interests are quasi-automatically bound by compromises made in the Second 
Chamber, whether they fmd these compromises convincing or not. 
Indirect territorial representation is also a feature of the Committee of the 
Regions. This fact led the representatives of the German Lander to the mistaken 
assumption that in the Committee they could expect decision-making processes 
similar to the ones in the Bundesrat. But interest intermediation is made more 
difficult in the Committee, because of the great differences in the constitutional 
quality of the single regions represented, their differences in size arid in policy-
style traditions, and the different degree of responsibility they may feel towards 
the individual citizen in the regional entity they represent. This may influence 
their respective abilities to come to compromises and to defend these 
compromises at home. At the same time, the more general problems of indirect 
representation - transparency, responsiveness and democratic accountability -
remain. 
11.4. Direct Elections 
Directly elected Second Chambers have a greater degree of legitimacy in their 
national political systems than indirectly elected ones. They avoid to some 
extent the problems of accountability and responsiveness. However, direct 
elections to Second Chambers always involve the danger of a duplication of the 
election to the First Chamber. The general solution found for this problem is 
that different electoral systems are used for the election to the two chambers. 
Following from these observations one could advance a strategy that has so 
far not been debated: regional elections could be contested for the membership 
of the Committee of the Regions. Of course, unitary states will have some 
difficulties with such a suggestion, because it would no doubt also entail 
consequences for the national balance of power between regions and national 
117 
level as well. The experience of elections to the European Parliament for which 
' as yet, no unitary electoral system operates does not,offer much encouragement. 
But this experience could also be helpful, since it shows that regional elections 
under different electoral systems in the Member States may be an alternative. 
l/.5. Representation and Party Politics 
As parties have become central actors in domestic interest intermediation, West 
European politics are now also party politics. In Second Chambers party politics 
compete with or have even become dominant over territorial politics. In extreme 
cases (as in the German Bundesrat) parties may use their majorities in Second 
Chambers to make up as much as possible for their minority position in the 
First. Alternatively, the national executive may threaten to change party political 
majorities in the Second Chamber by new appointments as Brian Mulroney did 
when he was prime minister of Canada. 
On the European level the party system is much less coherent than on the 
national level. This is not surprising as we do not yet have a fully developed 
European political system. There exist, however, ideological families of parties 
who share some values, strategies and aims. If there is a broad consensus on the 
aim of the Committee of the Regions, namely to strengthen the regional level 
of government in Europe, it may well be possible that party politics become a 
useful tool of interest aggregation. This may be supported by the presence of 
parties in other European institutions, namely the European Parliament and by 
the transnational associations of political parties. 
III. Conclusion 
Second Chambers are in a situation comparable to that of the Committee of the 
Regions. They, too, stand for an alternative notion of representation and 
participation within their political systems. Whereas historical arguments can be 
found to explain the existence of Second Chambers, the most valid theoretical 
argument for the presence of the Committee of the Regions is the subsidiarity 
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principle. In this respect the Committee of the Regions may be. seen as part of 
the strategy to fight the "democratic deficit". (Scott/Peterson/Millar 1994: 60) 
A less abstract argument could justify the existence of the Committee of the 
Regions, that is , that it can assist in the functioning of Europe~ integration. As 
has been argued, from the perspective of participation the advisory role o~ the 
Committee has its potentials, especially if lmowledge of regiOnal 
problem-solving capacity (Clement 1993:170) proves to be a first step for a 
broader access to European decision-making. Administration and culture 
(Majone 1990) are fields in which, without too much controversy, a mor_e fo~~ 
le of the Committee may be possible. With regard to representatiOn 1t IS 
ro . 
rtainly necessary for the Committee to overcome the stage of symbolic ce . 
representation and to strengthen its territorial links. One way of raising Its 
profile in the regions may be the - admittedly still utopi~ - i~ea of direct 
elections of its members. Holding meetings of the Comm1ttee m European 
regions might be another improvement. One big chance for the Co~ttee lies, 
of course, in a more general reform of EU institutions. But the Comnuttee d~s 
not need to wait for this kind of deus ex machina to improve its role as a voice 
of the European regions. 
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